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TECHNOLOGY MATTERS: THE COURTS, MEDIA
NEUTRALITY, AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Deborah Tussy*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two centuries, copyright law has adapted, though not always
quickly or easily, to the development and popularization of new technologies as
diverse as player pianos, photography, television, radio, and photocopiers.
Electronic media pose the most serious challenge thus far to copyright's most
basic concepts, down to and including even the definition of an actionable copy.
Congress has responded to technological change by extending copyright
protection to new subject matters and media' and, most recently, by blessing
copyright protection technologies.2 Courts applying the copyright statutes,
however, often face the difficult task of applying generalized legislative language
to the particular workings of technologies not fully anticipated by Congress.
In White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., the Supreme Court applied copyright
law to the then-new and rapidly growing technology of player pianos and piano
rolls.3 Rejecting the argument that Congress meant to protect copyrighted
musical works against infringement by any means of expression which embodied
the composer's work, the Court found that piano rolls did not infringe compos-
ers' copyrights because piano rolls were not human-readable copies of the
compositions, like sheet music, but merely devices which operated player pianos.
The Copyright Act, the Court said,
has not provided for the protection of the intellectual conception
apart from the thing produced, however meritorious such concep-
tion may be, but has provided for the making and filing of a
* Associate Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. Thanks to Sam Lupica and
to participants in the OCU Faculty Colloquium and the 2003 Works-in-Progress IP Colloquium at
Tulane for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The writing of this Article was supported
by a grant from the Kerr Foundation and Law Alumni Fund.
'I. Trotter Hardy, Copynight and New Use Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659, 663-66 (1999).
2 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (prohibiting circumvention of technological measures
protecting copyrighted works).
3 209 U.S. 1 (1908). Piano rolls are perforated paper cylinders which serve as templates
directing player pianos to perform popular musical works.
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tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is
the purpose of the statute to protect the composer.
4
Courts may yet cite White-Smith favorably for its reluctance to expand copyright
protection too readily to new technologies,' but Congress stepped in to correct
its narrow, technical interpretation of the copyright statute by adopting the
principle of media neutrality.
Media neutrality, in general terms, means that the copyright owner's rights
should be the same regardless of the form, whether analog or digital, in which the
work may be embodied or fixed. Congress adopted broad statutory language
including within copyright's ambit all existing and later developed media through
which works could be communicated either directly or with the aid of a device.6
It intended to provide courts with much-needed flexibility to re-interpret existing
copyright law in light of new technologies, authorizing the judiciary to expand
copyright as necessary to meet the challenges posed by, in particular, new
electronic technologies! While courts have only rarely discussed the principle of
media neutrality at length, they have certainly taken an active role in applying
often minimalist statutory directives to electronic works, notably by developing
a body of law fleshing out the contours of copyright protection for software.'
In several recent cases, however, courts addressing copyright claims involving
electronic information storage and retrieval systems have relied heavily on
functional characteristics of the systems in crafting judgments that construe key
concepts of copyright law. These cases illustrate technology-centered, as opposed
to media neutral, analyses and demonstrate a certain tension between the principle
of media-neutrality and the countervailing judicial reluctance to venture too far
into the field of policymaking without legislative guidance.
While that reluctance was historically prevalent in formalistic judgments like
that rendered in White-Smith, the Supreme Court reformulated it in policy-based
4 Id. at 17.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.11, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 665, 673 (1984).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining the term "copy").
Congress first responded to White-Smith in the 1909 Copyright Act by establishing a
compulsory license for recordings of musical works. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) for the current
provision. In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress more explicitly overruled White-Smith by establishing
the principle of media neutrality in 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 (2000). See Hardy, supra note 1, at 673-78;
see also infra Part II.A.
s See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (reinterpreting
the traditional copyright infringement analysis in the context of nonliteral copying of software);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cit.
1983) (establishing copyright protection for operating system software as embodied in source, code,
object code, and ROM chips).
[Vol. 12:427
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MEDIA NEUTRALITY
terms in its influential decision in the Sony case.9 The Court suggested a cautious
approach where judicial extension of copyright protection could adversely impact
innovation in unrelated technology markets by, in effect, giving copyright owners
veto power over the dissemination of new, potentially useful technologies. A
superficial reading of the media neutrality principle coupled with Sony's staple
article of commerce doctrine calls to mind a game of "hot potato" in which
Congress and the Court each attempt to pass off responsibility for the trouble-
some issue of technological adaptation. ° I suggest, however, that media neutrality
and the staple article of commerce doctrine can profitably be read together to
produce an informed, balanced judicial approach to new technologies which
recognizes, but does not unduly rely on, technological distinctions among delivery
systems.
In Part II of this Article, I propose a broad reading of the media neutrality
principle and explore the difficulty in digital environments of drawing clear
borders among the intangible work, its tangible embodiments, and the electronic
infrastructure translating between the two. I then outline the staple article of
commerce doctrine and suggest that it be read in conjunction with media
neutrality to produce a policy-informed, empirically-based judicial approach to
new technologies. In Part II1, I review three sets of cases dealing with videogame
enhancements, database compilations, and peer-to-peer music sharing. Each set
is a cycle in which two or more courts faced similar issues. In each set of cases,
at least one court employs a White-Smith-like focus on technological detail and
definitional readings of statutory language or established copyright concepts. In
these cases, technology matters more than it should in a media neutral regime,
with the result that the varying fortunes of the parties depend on the precise
architecture of certain electronic storage and retrieval systems as viewed through
the lens of copyright doctrines defining reproduction, distribution, adaptation,
and secondary infringement liability. Part IV explores in greater depth common
issues raised by these cases, including flaws in the courts' analytical approach to
technology-intensive cases, related concerns about the level of the courts'
understanding of the technologies, and apparent disadvantages of technology-
driven decisionmaking. In Part V, I suggest that a narrow focus on particular
technologies contravenes the principle of media neutrality. I propose a more
balanced judicial analysis, that, insofar as possible, accords like legal treatment to
functional equivalents, giving greater weight to established copyright principles
and to policies concerning fairness, incentives, and innovation than to technologi-
9 Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
10 See id. The staple article of commerce doctrine immunizes providers of technologies with
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cal specifics. Technological variations would matter under this approach,
particularly with respect to determinations of equivalency and secondary liability,
but should not, standing alone, be outcome determinative.
In this Article, I do not intend to offer a comprehensive review of judicial
treatments of electronic technology; however, I do intend to point out, in several
discrete contexts, the difficulties caused where courts concentrate too closely on
technological trees without due regard to the broader view of the forest. The
technology-centered decisions may be modern White-Smiths pursuing definitional
minutiae while paying insufficient attention to broader policy concerns.
II. THE BASICS: MEDIA NEUTRALITY, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, AND SONY
This part discusses the provenance of the principle of media neutrality and
particular difficulties that electronic media may pose for media-neutral interpreta-
tion of copyright law. I propose a broad interpretation of the principle to require
that, where statutory guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts faced with new
systems for storing, retrieving, and transmitting copyrighted content should apply
copyright law in a technology-neutral manner. Media neutrality, so construed,
confers fairly broad authority on courts to extend protection to copyrighted
content distributed through new technologies. I suggest, however, that judicial
concerns about the relative institutional competencies of Congress and the courts,
most clearly expressed in the Sony decision, impose limitations on the courts'
authority to expand copyright protection where important countervailing policies
are in play.
A. MEDIA NEUTRALITY AND THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT
The 1976 Copyright Act reinforced the traditional distinction between the
intangible work and its tangible embodiments. The distinction now marks the
boundary between the copyright owner's statutory rights in the intangible work"
and the rights of a lawful copy owner in the physical copy under the first sale
doctrine, which cuts off the copyright owner's right to control particular copies
once they have been sold. 2
n The copyright owner possesses a statutorily-defined bundle of rights that includes the right
to reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords, the right to prepare derivative works, the right
to distribute the work in copies or phonorecords, and the rights to publicly perform and display
works, including the right to publicly perform sound recordings by digital audio transmission. See
17 U.S.C. 5 106 (2000). Additionally, as will be seen in the database cases, compilers of collective
works possess a revision privilege. See 17 U.S.C. 5 201(c) (2000).
12 The first sale doctrine originally derived from the common law prohibition of restraints on
alienation of chattels and is now codified as 17 U.S.C. 109(a) (2000). See H.R. REP. No. 98-987,
[Vol. 12:427
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MEDIA NEUTRALITY
Congress established the legal line between the work and the copy through its
formulation of the fixation requirement. Fixation in a tangible medium of
expression-that is embodiment in material form in a copy or phonorecord-is
the defining act that brings an intangible work within the protection of federal
copyright law. 3 Fixation is also required to establish infringement of the
reproduction and distribution rights;" as a practical matter, the real scope of
copyright protection is often established in infringement actions. In order to
assure that copyright law remained media neutral, Congress defined fixation of
works to include "any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 5
As noted in the legislative history:
This broad language is intended to avoid the artificial and largely
unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as [White-
Smith] ... under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has
been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work
is fixed. Under the bill it makes no difference what the form,
manner, or medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words,
numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic
indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means
of any machine or device 'now known or later developed.'16
at 2 (1984). The distinction between works and copies is of particular importance in limiting the
scope of the derivative works right. See Amy B. Cohen, When Does A Work Infringe the Dervative
Works Right ofa Copyright Owner?, 17 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 623,629-33 (1999) (discussing the
historical development of, and inherent tension between, the first sale doctrine and the derivative
works right).
13 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2000). A work is deemed to be "created" when it is first fixed in a
copy or phonorecord. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Unfixed works may still receive protection under
state common law copyright, but are not protected under the federal act.
14 The reproduction and distribution rights of the copyright holder are specifically limited to
copies and phonorecords, which are defined as material objects in which works are fixed. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101,106 (2004). Whether fixation is a prerequisite for infringement of the derivative works rights
is an unsettled question. See infra Part III.A.
15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
16 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5665 (1976).
20051
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Media neutrality language also appears in a series of key statutory definitions, 7
though such language is noticeably absent from the definitions of derivative
works and compilations." Congress intended, by the adoption of generalized
language, to provide copyright law with the flexibility to accommodate new media
without extensive legislative revision.' 9 It rejected the formalistic approach taken
17 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which
are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as
projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying
sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or
tapes, in which the works are embodied ....
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other
than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed ....
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in
a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting
of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of
this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission ....
"Literary works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied....
"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term "phonorecords" includes the material
object in which the sounds are first fixed ....
"Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
Id.
8s See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statutory provision establishing compilers' revision rights also lacks
media neutrality language. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
i9 See Hardy, supra note 1, at 665. Hardy notes that, prior to the 1976 revisions, the courts and
Congress sometimes incorporated new technologies into copyright's subject matter by adding new
abstract subject matters (such as dramatic works) and sometimes by adding specific media (such as
photographs). Id. at 661-66.
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by the Court in White-Smith in favor of a more pragmatic 20 approach, granting
courts considerable leeway to extend copyright law to cover new technologies.
In establishing fixation as the dividing line between the intangible work and
the tangible copy, and declaring fixation to be media neutral, Congress most
clearly focused on the possible physical embodiments of the intangible works.
The statutory provisions containing media neutrality language specifically refer to
material objects such as books, periodicals, disks, and tapes. Copies and
phonorecords, the only two recognized categories of embodiments, are defined
as material objects,2' and the rights of reproduction and distribution are limited
to copies and phonorecords. Certainly, the copyright statute has accommodated
new storage media such as audiotapes, videotapes, compact disks (CDs), and
digital versatile disks (DVDs).23
Broader readings of media neutrality are, however, current and plausible. In
general usage, the term "medium" denotes not only physical storage media, but,
more generally, systems of communication or entertainment such as the broadcast
media.24 Media neutrality, in a variety of legal contexts, conveys the meaning that
o I employ the common, not the philosophical, usage of the term "pragmatic." Nor have I
made a systematic attempt to fashion an approach that is particularly consistent with Richard
Posner's principles of pragmatic adjudication. See RiCHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 59-85 (2003). My discussion of the Aimster case illustrates that Posner's pragmatism
tracks favorably with the analytical approach advocated herein, though his particular interpretation
of the Sony standard for noninfringing uses is more stringent than I would advocate. See infra Part
III.c.
21 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5666 states:
'copies' and 'phonorecords' together will comprise all of the material objects in
which copyrightable works are capable of being fixed. The definitions of these
terms in section 101, together with their usage in section 102 and throughout the
bill, reflect a fundamental distinction between the 'original work' which is the
product of 'authorship' and the multitude of material objects in which it can be
embodied. Thus, in a sense of the bill, a 'book' is not a work of authorship, but
is a particular kind of 'copy.' Instead, the author may write a 'literary work,'
which in turn can be embodied in a wide range of 'copies' and 'phonorecords,'
including books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings,
and so forth. It is possible to have an 'original work of authorship' without
having a 'copy' or 'phonorecord' embodying it, and it is also possible to have a
'copy' or 'phonorecord' embodying something that does not qualify as an
'original work of authorship.' Two essential elements-original work and
tangible object-must merge through fixation in order to produce subject matter
copyrightable under the statute.
Id.
22 See 17 U.S.C. S 106.
23 See Hardy, spra note 1, at 665-66.
24 See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 771 (11 th ed. 2003).
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law should not favor any particular technology over another.25 The language of
the House Report suggesting statutory indifference to the "form, manner, or
medium" of fixation supports an expansive reading of the term "media neutrality"
to mean, in essence, technology neutrality.26 I suggest, therefore, that the
principle of media neutrality mandates that courts interpreting copyright law, in
the absence of explicit congressional guidance regarding particular technologies,
ideally should remain neutral with respect to different technologies of reproduc-
tion and dissemination, whether those technologies are analog or digital and
whether courts face issues of copyrightability or infringement. Transfers ofworks
from one medium to another should not affect copyright protection nor should
particular technological configurations be determinative of such protection. This
interpretation is consonant with the legislative goal of making copyright law
adaptable to new technologies.
Congress retains its prerogative to provide expressly for special treatment of
particular technologies by statute, as it has done on occasion in the past.
Congress has, for example, elected to treat digital and radio transmissions of
sound recordings differendy27 and has adopted special provisions governing cable
and satellite television which accord them treatment different from that given to
broadcast television.28 The history of cable television, in fact, provides another
instance of formalist adjudication that forced Congress to take legislative action
25 The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN), for example, is
characterized as media neutral because it does not favor any one electronic signature technology over
another. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7003 (2000)); see, e.g.,
Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001 Developments, 57 Bus. LAW. 541,544 (2001). Provisions
of revised Article 9 concerning filing of security interests are similarly characterized. U.C.C. § 9
(2001); see, e.g., William J. Murphy, Proposalfor a CentraliZed and Integrated Registyfor Securiy Interests in
IntellectualProper y, 41 IDEA 297, 349 (2002). Even proposals for online gambling regulation have
been characterized as media neutral on grounds that on- and off-line gambling should receive similar
legal treatment. See Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Wlhy Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569 (1999).
26 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5665 (1976).
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (giving the copyright owner the right to publicly perform sound
recordings by means of digital audio transmission). No similar right is accorded for analog broadcast
of sound recordings.
28 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (establishing a statutory royalty for secondary transmissions
by cable television companies); 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000) (codifying special provisions for secondary
transmissions by satellite carriers). These provisions deal with centralized transmissions by
commercial enterprises, whereas modem digital networks, by their nature, involve decentralized
activities by users as well as commercial providers.
[Vol. 12:427
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to address a new technology,29 which was the scenario that Congress sought to
minimize by adopting the principle of media neutrality.
The legislative history of the 1976 Act makes clear that Congress expected
copyright law to encompass electronic embodiments of works and that the rule
of media neutrality applies to such embodiments. In fact, the foreseeable
proliferation of electronic media was a driving force behind adoption of the
principle.30 It is unlikely that Congress fully understood the consequences of
applying its expansive definition of fixation to digitized information. The nature
of electronic media and the fluid relationships between intangible works and
electronic storage and retrieval systems complicate distinctions between the
tangible copy and the intangible work.
B. THE ELECTRONIC CHALLENGE
Fixation, in digital works, occurs in computer memory as well as on physical
media. Computers utilize both permanent read-only memory (ROM), the
contents of which cannot be changed, and temporary random access memory
(RAM), the contents of which may disappear when the computer is turned off
unless captured automatically in the computer's "cache" or "saved" to a physical
29 Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 111 to resolve an ongoing dispute between the broadcast
television industry and cable television industries over the payment of royalties for re-transmission
of copyrighted, broadcast works. See Hardy, supra note 1. Prior to adoption of the 1976 revisions,
the Supreme Court, taking a formalistic approach, held that such retransmissions were not
"performances" within the meaning of the 1909 Act. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1968). A strong argument could be made that
Congress should adhere more closely to its own prescription for media neutrality. Its periodic
interventions on behalf of various powerful industries have produced legislation remarkable both
for its complexity (indeed, near-incomprehensibility) and its susceptibility to influence. Technology-
specific fixes to address the copyright crisis du jour do little to improve the law's adaptability to
future technological evolution.
" During the drafting of the 1976 Act, Congress heard specific testimony concerning the
development of electronic storage and retrieval systems. The Register of Copyrights recommended
media neutrality as a means of assuring copyright's adaptability to such technologies. Staff of House
Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong., Copyright Law Revision Part 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW; 1965
REVISION, BILL 624A (Comm. Print 1965). The 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act brought
computer programs within the scope of copyright by adding them to the list of defined works and
providing for limitations on the reproduction and adaptation rights in favor of owners of copies of
programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 117. These amendments were recommended by the Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) which concluded that computer
programs were the proper subject matter of copyright. See NAT'L CoMM. ON NEW TECHNOLOGI-
CAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report].
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storage medium. Programs and other information that the computer is not
currently using are stored. There are many variations on storage architecture.
Some computers may cache information on the hard disc and recall it into RAM;
others may cache information in a separate memory chip located adjacent to the
processing unit.3 1 Often information is stored on magnetic media such as the
computer's hard disk, floppy disks, CDs, or DVDs.
32
Computer programs (software) comprise instructions which cause computers,
or other electronic devices, to perform desired functions.3 3 Programs take the
form of object code, a binary language of zeros and ones (bits) acting as on-off
switches for electrical charges as the programs interact with the machine. 34
Content such as audiovisual images, musical recordings, or the text of news
reports is also captured in this form.3' The basic nature of computer programs,
particularly when combined with network capabilities, raises several challenges to
media-neutral application of copyright law. First, electronic sequences of bits
cannot, in all states, readily be characterized as tangible, stable copies or
phonorecords for purposes of establishing fixation. Second, electronic media
muddy the traditional boundaries between categories of copyrightable works,
particularly those separating the original work from later byproducts of the
original such as compilations and derivative works. Finally, electronic media
permit unprecedented infringement by end users, which enhances tensions among
copyright owners, users, and the providers of technologies that enable user
infringement.
" See I. Trotter Hardy, Computer Ram "Copies" A Hit OrA Myth? Historical Perpectives On Caching
As A Microcosm Of Current Copyight Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 425, 427 n.5 (1997).
32 Unlike information in RAM, which consists of electrical pulses, information stored on
magnetic media takes the form of magnetic charges. When the information is needed, the computer
reads magnetically stored information from permanent storage, translates it into electrical pulses in
RAM, and transfers it to the central processing unit which performs the operations called for by a
particular program. See Bradley J. Nicholson, The Ghost In The Machine- MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., And The Problm Of Copying In Ram, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 148-50 (1995).
31 See 17 U.S.C. 5 101 ("A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.").
3 See Nicholson, supra note 32, at 149-50.
3 Unlike traditional media in which music, writings, and images were embodied as physical
representations of the recorded work, digital technology reproduces those same sights, sounds, and
words as numbers. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction Of Copyight: NapsterAnd The
New Economics Of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 270 (2002). Music is digitally recorded
by measuring the height of the sound wave generated by music at 44,100 times per second and
recording those samples instead of physically reproducing the sound wave in the grooves of a vinyl
album. Images are reduced to component dots and numbers are assigned to those dots to represent
color. Text is the easiest content to digitize. ASCII code, which is almost universally used to digitize
text, assigns code numbers to each typewriter character. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28-30 (2000).
[Vol. 12:427
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1. Tangible Copies. Some commentators view object code not as a true copy
but as an intermediate language which translates information into digital form,
creating a sort of quasi-copy of the work which enables hardware and software
to recreate a copy of the work for display on a computer screen. 6 Even assuming
that object code represents a true copy for copyright purposes, code changes
states in a way that prior reproductive technologies did not and its tangibility in
some of those states is questionable." When object code is stored on a physical
storage medium, most would probably concede that a tangible fixation of the
work represented by the code exists on that medium.38 But code also exists in
operational states relatively free of permanent storage media. It functions in
temporary computer memory and can be transmitted via radio waves, through
telephone and cable wires, and across fiber optic networks.39 In these situations,
object code takes dynamic, evanescent forms.
A particularly thorny question arises with respect to the duration of electronic
copies, since copyright requires that the medium of fixation be stable for a period
of more than transitory duration.' Significant disputes have arisen over
copyright's treatment of temporary RAM copies4 and file transmissions.42 The
36 See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 293, 296, 299 (2001). Lastowka observes that digitization makes all copies less "real"
not only in the physical sense, but in terms of declining value. Jane Ginsburg touches on both the
materiality and translation problem:
[W]hile digital media in one sense de-mateialized copies, by instantly, albeit
intangibly, converting any work into a series of 1s and Os available for receipt in
RAM, recipients not only could perceive the works fleetingly in "real" time, but
they also held the power to re-materialize them into retention copies....
Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development of an Access Right
in U.S. Copyright Law, COLUM. LAW SCHOOLPUB. LAW& LEGALTHEORY WORKING PAPER GROUP,
Paper Number 8, 2 (2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taPabstractzid=222493.
" The tangibility issue is reminiscent of the vanishing common law distinction between trespass
and nuisance. Historically, trespass law applied to physical invasions of property, while nuisance law
covered "non-physical" invasions such as noxious fumes or loud noise. As modem science teaches,
the latter also represent physical, if invisible, phenomena. Similar issues now arise in cases applying
the doctrine of trespass to chattels to electronic information gathering. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The
Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27 (2000).
38 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges ofElectronic Distribution and Reproduction,
66 BROOK. L. REv. 473, 485 n.65 (2000) (observing that fixing a writing on a digital medium such
as a CD or an online database constitutes both fixation and reproduction, but arguing that RAM
copies should be considered neither fixed nor reproductions).
" Shih Ray Ku, supra note 35, at 271.
40 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1249-52, 1252 n.15 (2001) (recognizing that digital copies have a
physical existence but categorizing them as "largely intangible" compared to more traditional copies
on the basis of their greater manipulability and evanescence). Liu distinguishes between RAM copies
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legislative history of the Copyright Act indicates that temporary instantiations of
works in computer memory should not be viewed as fixations.43 The Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses (CONTU) which recommended copyright law
as the primary protective regime for computer programs seemingly advised the
opposite."4 A number of courts have ruled that RAM copies are fixations, and
hence potentially infringing copies.45
Notwithstanding substantial scholarly argument to the contrary,46 the
pronounced tendency in the courts is to treat even evanescent digital code as
sufficiently material and stable to constitute fixation. Indeed, the courts have
generally dealt with digital code as a rough functional equivalent of a traditional
analog copy or phonorecord.47 This result is consistent with media neutrality.
and copies stored on magnetic storage media which are more clearly fixed. He speculates on
whether the stored digital copy of magnetic zeros and ones could be distinguished entirely from its
storage medium, but notes that prior media like audio and video tapes also captured magnetic
patterns (analog rather than digital) on physical substrates. Id. at 1304 n.203, 1308 n.217.
42 See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The Pubic Diplay Ri'ght: The CopynghtAct's Negcted Solution To The
Controversy Over Ram "Copies", 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 128 (2001) (arguing that the transmission of
encoded data over the Internet no more makes a copy of the work than does a television broadcast
of the work).
" The House Report provides: "[T]he definition of 'fixation' would exclude from the concept
purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the 'memory' of
a computer." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 5666. The reference to computer memory, while not
specific, appears to exclude volatile RAM memory and, by analogy to television broadcasts, the
reference to transient reproductions would appear to exclude electronic transmissions.
' In somewhat ambiguous language, CONTU's report observed that "the placement of a
copyrighted work into a computer.., is the preparation of a copy .... Because works in computer
storage may be repeatedly reproduced, they are fixed and, therefore, are copies ...." CONTU
Report, supra note 30, at 22. Niels Schaumann observes that, at the time the CONTU report was
written, the term "memory" was frequently used to mean any form of computer storage, whether
volatile or permanent. Niels Schaumann, Copynght Infringement and Peer-To-Peer Technology, 28 WM.
MITCHELLL. REv. 1001, 1026 n.100 (2002). He suggests that CONTU may have been referring to
disk storage rather than to RAM storage. Id.
"s See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1458, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1993); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F.
Supp. 2d 1290, 1294, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1428 (D. Utah 1999); Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1443, 1448-49 (E.D. Va. 1994).
* See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 38, at 475; Liu, supra note 41, at 1252; Reese, supra note 42, at 84.
47 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1668, 1670 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting the argument that MP3 files were not reproductions
because the sounds they captured were not physically identical to the sounds on the originals, and
noting that the difference was not detectible by the human ear). Id. n.1. The opinion is somewhat
vague as to whether MP3 files are reproductions or derivative works, referring to the copyright
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Electronic impulses are, after all, physical phenomena and their effects, while not
directly perceptible, are certainly so with the aid of a machine or device. The
evanescence of code is, however, decidedly a factor in the videogame cases
discussed infra.4 .
2. Original Works and Their Byproducts. Electronic media inherently pose
problems in defining the byproducts of original works, such as derivative works,
collective works, and revisions. Bits may represent content (text, graphic images,
and the like) or encode functional computer programs-thereby intertwining
content and method of delivery.49 Congress was untroubled by the fact that an
embodiment in a particular medium might recreate the work indirectly by
operating a machine. Works captured in electronic media, however, are usually
perceivable only through a machine or device enabled by software, which is a
separately copyrightable artifact.5 ° The addition of software to content may
trigger re-categorization of the resulting work, for copyright purposes, as a
derivative or collective work.
Traditional copyright assumes the existence of an original work, captured in
a particular medium, which may later undergo simple transfer into new media, but
may also be adapted into new derivative works or incorporated into compilations.
Under existing case law, change of medium alone is insufficient to create a
derivative work, but addition of new, copyrightable material may create a
potentially infringing derivative.51 Mere translation of a work from analog to
electronic media, or from one electronic format to another, may require the
addition of independently copyrightable software even though no changes are
owners' right to license reproductions for derivative markets. See id.
48 See infra Part III.A.
41 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)
illustrates the dual function of bits as representations of content and operational elements of
software programs. The MAP files at issue did not encode actual screen displays, but rather
instructed the game engine and art files to create the displays. See infra Part IlI.A.4. In theory,
current copyright law treats digitized content and software in the same way, notwithstanding their
functional differences.
0 This is true of all products designed for use on computers, which require software to enable
the use of content (or indeed to instruct the machine to do anything at all). Special-purpose digital
devices may have such capabilities built into hardware though, increasingly, even special-purpose
devices such as VCRs incorporate some computer-like capabilities for storage and computation. The
line between software and hardware is often indistinct. See NAT'L REsEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
35, at 44.
"1 See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 756-57
(2d Cir. 1976). Similarly, mere change of medium has been held not to be transformational for
purposes of fair use analysis. See, e.g., Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295, 1297-98 (2d Cir. 1998) (retransmission of radio broadcast over telephone
lines is not transformative); UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (reproduction
of audio CD into MP3 format is not transformative).
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made in content, arguably requiring classification of the work as a derivative or
collective work rather than a mere copy. One court has suggested in dictum that
the addition of software in transformation of a work from an analog to a digital
medium may be a sufficient variation to create a new, potentially infringing
collective work.52
The fluidity of content captured in electronic media further complicates the
traditional distinction between original works and their byproducts since the same
data may be reorganized to produce any number of products, such as printed
newspapers, CDs, or individual articles displayed online. The data may undergo
multiple conversions not only from analog to digital media, or vice versa, but also
into different electronic formats.53 Identification of a particular manifestation of
the work as original, derivative, or a revision becomes problematic. The difficulty
of adhering to traditional distinctions between original works and their byprod-
ucts plays a role in the videogame and database cases.s4
3. The User-Centric Universe. Finally, electronic media give users, as well as
publishers, opportunities both to produce perfect copies and to modify works in
ways not possible in prior media. When Internet access is added to electronic
capabilities, users also become mass distributors of works. Traditional copyright
law primarily targeted enforcement against institutional copiers and distributors
of works, not end users. While analog copying technologies such as the
photocopier and home taping presented serious challenges to the gatekeeper
model of enforcement, digital technologies raised the stakes immeasurably.
Reluctant to sue their own customers, copyright owners have often chosen to
litigate against the providers of new technologies of reproduction and dissemina-
tion, attempting to curtail the use of such technologies.55 Such suits bring into
play a set of competing policy concerns, forcing judicial consideration not only
of traditional copyright policies balancing incentives against access, but also of
policies favoring technological innovation.
The courts in many of the cases discussed herein struggle with the allocation
of liability between potentially infringing users and the technology providers who
enable their activities. The most certifiable embodiments of the works in question
appear, at users' command, on their screens or hard drives, placing users at the
52 See Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1273 n.12, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1267, 1272 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001).
" For example, music stored on digital CDs can be converted into MP3 files. The district court
in UMG Recordings referred to such electronic reformatting as a medium change notwithstanding that
both formats were electronic in nature.
s4 See infra Parts III.A and B.
5 See Mark A. Lemley & Anthony R. Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1346, 1373-78 (2004); Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 679, 712-14 (2003).
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center of in fringement actions in ways not anticipated by traditional copyright law.
The Supreme Court first faced the issue of technology-enabled consumer
infringements in Sony Coop. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios.6 In that case, the
Court created an analytical framework which imposes some limitations on the
courts' authority, granted under the principle of media neutrality, to extend
copyright protection to new technologies.
C. SONY AND SECONDARY LIABILITY
In all of the cases discussed herein, the defendants are providers of devices or
software that enable consumer activities which may infringe one or more of the
copyright owner's rights. Consequently, contributory and vicarious infringement
claims are common. The Copyright Act contains no express statutory language
establishing requirements for contributory or vicarious liability for infringement,
but courts have established such requirements under general rules for secondary
liability."7 The Supreme Court's decision in Sony remains the most influential case
on secondary liability both for its adoption of the staple article of commerce
doctrine and for its interpretation of fair use in the context of third party products
or services which enable user infringements. The Sony Court refers interchange-
ably to both contributory and vicarious infringement, though, on its facts, the case
applies only to contributory infringement.
58
In Sony, movie studios sought to enjoin the sale of videotape recorders on the
grounds that they contributed to infringement by home users who taped
copyrighted material from broadcast television. 9 The Court adapted the staple
article of commerce doctrine from patent law, holding that copyright owners may
not preclude distribution of technologies which might be used to infringe
copyrights but which also have substantial noninfringing uses.6" In such cases,
courts should await legislative guidance. Justice Stevens observed:
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the
copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring
56 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984).
57 Seeid. at 435. A contributory infringer is one who, with knowledge or reason to know of likely
infringement by others, materially contributes to, causes, or induces the direct infringement. Id A
vicarious infringer is one with the right and ability to control the infringers who benefits financially
from the infringement. Id.
" See Stacy L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implicalions ofSonyfor Napster and Other Internet
Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 940 (2001). The Ninth Circuit limits Sony to its facts inA&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729 (9th Cir. 2001).
5' Sony, 464 U.S. at 419.
60 Id. at 442.
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theme .... Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter
the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitu-
tional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully
the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
implicated by such new technology.6
Applying the standard four-factor test for fair use,62 the Court read the
doctrine to presumptively favor noncommercial uses such as home taping. In the
context of the case, the Court found that time-shifting63 by users was a fair use
and, therefore, a substantial noninfringing use.' While Sony announced a broad
policy protective of technological innovation, the court crafted its actual holding
narrowly, focusing only on time-shifting and emphasizing the fact that broadcasts
were already made available free to the public.6" The scope and applicability of
Sony has bedeviled lower courts ever since"' and recurs as a constant refrain in the
storage-and-retrieval cases.
Sony balanced the necessity of copyright incentives for content creators against
policies favoring non-interference with technological innovation in unrelated
fields which might benefit society as a whole. This balancing of interests echoes
the utilitarian approach to copyright, constitutionally based in the Copyright
Clause, which mandates that the creation of incentives for creators, through
limited monopolies, must be offset against the public interest in broad dissemina-
tion of works.67 The development of digital media of reproduction and
dissemination may threaten the balance of copyright incentives and access, but
Sony warns that innovation policy must also be weighed by courts.
The Sony Court's refusal to read copyright too expansively to encompass new
technologies absent specific legislative guidance creates a useful tension with the
media neutrality principle. On the one hand, the congressional exhortation to
media neutrality encourages courts to interpret copyright law flexibly to
61 Id. at 431.
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The four factors are: "the purpose and character of the use...
the nature of the copyrighted work... the amount and substantiality [of the copyrighted work used
by the defendant] . .. [and] the effect of the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted
work." Id
63 Time-shifting means taping a program in order to watch it at a later time.
64 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-43.
6' Id. at 448-50.
6 See Dogan, supra note 58, at 940, 942-43 ("Neither the Supreme Court nor subsequent lower
court decisions have elucidated what kinds of products or services can qualify as staple articles of
commerce, nor have they provided a framework for deciding whether such an article has a
'substantial non- infringing use.' ").
67 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
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encompass new technologies. Sony does not necessarily conflict with this
principle. It simply forces courts to consider the countervailing interest in
innovation policy, establishing a sort of border, the substantial noninfringing use,
beyond which courts should not venture without legislative guidance. Both the
media neutrality principle and the Sony framework represent steps away from
formalistic interpretation of black letter law toward a more empirical, pragmatic
approach to judicial decisionmaking in new technology cases. The cases that
follow, however, illustrate difficulties later courts have faced in applying Sony
while maintaining media neutrality, when faced with new electronic storage and
retrieval systems.
III. THE CASES
In this part, three sets of cases illustrate varying judicial approaches to
electronic storage and retrieval systems. The cases involve video game enhance-
ments, database compilations, and internet file sharing applications and raise
similar questions regarding the impact of system architecture on copyright
infringement claims. In each set of cases, at least one court, in a well-known and
important decision, relies heavily on system characteristics in seeming contraven-
tion of the principle of media neutrality. The courts in Micro Starv. Formgen, Inc.,6"
New York Times Co. v. Tasini,69 and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,7° are the chief
offenders in this regard.
A. VIDEOGAME ENHANCEMENTS-DIFFERENT TREATMENT FOR SIMILAR
TECHNOLOGIES
The central cases in this segment, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo ofAmerica,
Inc.,71 and Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc.,72 were decided six years apart by the Ninth
Circuit. Mention must also be made of an older case, Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
International, Inc.,73 decided by the Seventh Circuit when both the current
Copyright Act and the videogame industry were in their infancies. The Midway
and Galoob courts employ balanced analyses, while Micro Star illustrates a
technology-centered analysis.
68 154 F.3d 1107,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
69 533 U.S. 483, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2003).
70 239 F.3d 1004, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729 (9th Cir. 2001).
71 964 F.2d 965,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (9th Cir. 1992).
72 154 F.3d 1107, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
71 704 F.2d 1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 791 (7th Cir. 1983).
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All three cases involve unauthorized enhancements to copyrighted videogames
and raise issues concerning the scope of the derivative works right. A derivative
work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. '74  The statutory
definition is generally conceded to be hopelessly overbroad, and courts have
struggled to impose limits on it. 75 In general, a mere change of medium is not
sufficient to create a derivative work, but a medium change accompanied by a
nontrivial variation from the original may do SO.76 The derivative work, then,
must be substantially similar to the original, but add something new. In the games
cases, plaintiffs rely on arguments that enhanced game displays constitute
unauthorized derivative works. Particularly in the two earliest opinions, the courts
were faced with scenarios in which uncertain legal doctrine must be applied to
new, and little understood, technologies. Read sequentially, the cases offer a
window into the rapid pace of technological change in the videogame industry.
Midway predates the popularization of videogame consoles and cartridges for
home use-the arcade game technology described by this court now seems almost
as antique as the piano roll.7 7 The defendant, Artic, manufactured printed circuit
boards which, when substituted for the original circuit board, speeded up the rate
74 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
71 See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (2002).
71 See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486,491, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 756-57
(2d Cir. 1976).
7 The court describes what was, at the time, state-of-the-art technology as follows:
Plaintiff manufactures video game machines. Inside these machines are printed
circuit boards capable of causing images to appear on a television picture screen
and sounds to emanate from a speaker when an electric current is passed through
them. On the outside of each machine are a picture screen, sound speaker, and
a lever or button that allows a person using the machine to alter the images
appearing on the machine's picture screen and the sounds emanating from its
speaker. Each machine can produce a large number of related images and
sounds. These sounds and images are stored on the machine's circuit
boards-how the circuits are arranged and connected determines the set of
sounds and images the machine is capable of making. When a person touches
the control lever or button on the outside of the machine he sends a signal to the
circuit boards inside the machine which causes them to retrieve and display one
of the sounds and images stored in them. Playing a video game involves
manipulating the controls on the machine so that some of the images stored in
the machine's circuitry appear on its picture screen and some of its sounds
emanate from its speaker.
Midway, 704 F.2d at 1010.
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of play of one of Midway's games." Midway arose before the copyrightability of
programs embodied in physical circuits was well-established. Arctic's circuit
boards literally copied Midway's program code, but Midway had registered only
its audiovisual displays, 9 forcing the court to address the case from the derivative
works standpoint despite the literal copying of Midway's code.
The derivative works question was one of first impression. Artic argued that
merely speeding up the rate of play of a game could not create a derivative work.
Analogizing the speeded-up video game to speeded-up play of a phonograph
record, the court admitted that merely speeding up a recording would not likely
create an unauthorized derivative work. The court, however, found a critical
distinction between recordings and videogames in that there was a lucrative
market for speeded-up videogames, but none for speeded-up sound recordings."0
Consequently, Artic's "fast" game was a substantially different product from the
original work and must be considered an unauthorized derivative work of
Midway's game. Midway's licensees, the arcade owners, lacked authorization to
create derivative works and were direct infringers; Artic committed contributory
infringement by selling the circuit boards.8 '
Acknowledging that videogames did not fit readily within the statutory
definition of derivative works, the court found that the definition could
appropriately be stretched to incorporate them, reciting the congressional intent
that the new Copyright Act be construed flexibly to cover new technologies.82
" Attic produced a circuit board which produced sounds and images nearly identical to
plaintiff's Pac-Man game. The court's discussion centers, however, on the speeded-up version of
Galaxian, with little specific discussion of the Pac-Man simulation. Id. at 1011.
" It is clear from the district court opinion that Artic's circuit boards copied much of the code
on Midway's ROM chips. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1004, 216
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413, 417 (D.C. Ill. 1982). In this case and a subsequent case involving a substitute
circuit board for Par-Man games, the district court provided a much more detailed analysis of the
technology involved in Midway's arcade games. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42 (N.D. 11. 1983). The circuit boards were composed of a number of ROM
chips containing different sets of instructions directing sequence of play and creation of displays.
Computer programs are protected by copyright as literary works. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Courts have
recognized the audiovisual display produced by the program as a separate copyrightable work. See,
e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (2d Cir. 1982).
'0 Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013-14. The court obviously did not anticipate the phenomenon of
music sampling.
" Id. at 1013. Here the court seems to have confused the arcade owners (the licensees) with the
actual players. Direct infringement would presumably occur when players activated and interacted
with the game circuit board, producing derivative audiovisual works on screen. The arcade owner,
like the manufacturer, would probably be considered a contributory infringer, i.e., one who with
actual knowledge of likely infringement materially contributed to the direct infringement, or a
vicarious infringer, i.e., one who could control the infringements and profited from them.
12 Id. at 1011.
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The court referenced earlier cases involving the copyrightability of screen displays
which relied on the media neutrality language incorporated in the definition of
audiovisual works. s
The Midway court devotes little ink to in-depth discussion of technological
details. Rather, it engages in fairly straightforward application of derivative works
principles as informed by a policy favoring flexible, media-neutral construction
designed to bring new technologies within the scope of copyright law. Notably,
the court does not discuss the need for a physical embodiment of a derivative
work, an issue which becomes critical in the Ninth Circuit cases. It does provide
an early airing of some recurring themes in the storage and retrieval cases: the use
of analogies to prior, non-digital technologies 84 and the importance of market
impact. Midway predates the Sony decision and the concerns with balancing
copyright incentives against technological innovation which come to the fore in
the Ninth Circuit cases.
By the time the Ninth Circuit faced the game enhancement question in
Galoob,8 the videogame industry had developed the familiar format in which
players interact with copyrighted games through a console and game cartridge,
viewing the game displays on home television screens. Galoob marketed a
popular add-on device, the Game Genie, which, like the circuit board in Midway,
enhanced the level of play of the plaintiff's copyrighted videogames. The Game
Genie, however, was a plug-in device inserted between the console and the game
cartridge and neither copied Nintendo's code nor replaced its existing products.
86
" See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding audiovisual display to be fixed for purposes of copyright protection); qC WGN
Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that television station owned copyright in the content of its broadcast but not the vertical
blanking interval which was part of the method of transmission).
84 With regard to fixation and its phonograph analogy, the court pays no heed to the fact that
playing a phonograph at faster than normal speed produces no fixed embodiment of the speeded-up
version, whereas fast Galaxian was embodied in a printed circuit.
85 Galoob, 964 F.2d 965.
86 Players using the Genie could augment the powers of their characters by, for example,
increasing speed of movement, adding lives, and allowing the character to float above obstacles. As
the court describes the Genie's functionality:
The player controls the changes made by the Game Genie by entering codes
provided by the Game Genie Programming Manual and Code Book. The player
also can experiment with variations of these codes. The Game Genie functions
by blocking the value for a single data-byte sent by the game cartridge to the
central processing unit in the Nintendo Entertainment System and replacing it
with a new value. If that value controls the character's strength, for example,
then the character can be made invincible by increasing the value sufficiently....
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Nintendo argued that Midway resolved the infringement issue; the Genie produced
an unauthorized derivative work and Galoob was a contributory infringer. The
Ninth Circuit, however, deployed a more complex analysis of the statutory
provisions, the challenged technology, and, post-Sony, issues of innovation policy
and fair use.
The definition of a derivative work, the court held, required not only that the
derivative work be substantially similar to the underlying work but also that it
must incorporate the protected work in some concrete or permanent form.87 To
confuse matters, the court added that incorporation in a concrete or permanent
form need not necessarily rise to the level of a fixation under the act, noting that,
unlike the definition of copies, the definition of derivative works contained no
reference to a fixation requirement.88
The Game Genie enhanced the displays originating in Nintendo's game
cartridges, but the modified displays were not captured by the Genie in any
concrete or permanent form. Consequently, the displays could not be derivative
works. The court rejected Nintendo's argument that the Game Genie's displays
were fixed in the device's hardware and software, noting that the Game Genie
alone could not produce a display at all, but must be used in conjunction with
Nintendo's console and cartridge.89 The court distinguished Midway noting that
Id. at 967. The district court opinion contains a more complete description of the device and its
various programming modes. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp.
1283, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
87 The court observed that the examples of derivative works listed in the definition all physically
incorporate the underlying work and that the Act's legislative history similarly indicated that the
infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form. Galoob, 964 F.2d
at 967.
88 Id. at 967-68. Nimmer observes that this pronouncement is dictum, given that the court found
that the Game Genie created no derivative work, and that the Galoob court itself tended to backslide
towards a fixation standard throughout its opinion. See II Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 75, §
8.09[A. As written, however, the opinion sets different standards for protectability and infringement
of derivative works, requiring fixation for the former but something less for the latter. The court
left unanswered the puzzling question how a concrete, permanent incorporation of the underlying
work might fail to meet the broad statutory definition of fixation. Despite some legislative history
hinting to the contrary, Nimmer would require fixation for infringement of the derivative works
right as well as for protection of authorized derivative works. Id. The Register of Copyrights recently
adopted a similar view, noting that, legislative history to the contrary, the language of the statute
requires that infringing derivative works be fixed because derivative works are works and the statute
says that works are created upon fixation. See The Fami# Movie Act of 2004: Hearng on H.KF 4586
Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intelkctual Prop., House Comm. on the Judiday, 108th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) (statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
89 Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968. Nintendo made an argument loosely based on media neutrality
language in the definition of audiovisual works, urging the court to compare the original displays
with the altered displays. See id. The court noted, however, that the only relevant issue was whether
the Genie was a derivative work, not whether it was an audiovisual work, since both the original and
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Attic's circuit board both copied and replaced Midway's original board. The
Game Genie, in the court's view, did neither.
90
Citing Sony, the Galoob court found that stretching the definition of derivative
works to include the displays triggered by the Genie might chill innovation,
preventing the development of useful add-on programs by categorizing them as
derivatives of basic applications. 9' Having disposed of any infringement claim,
the court nonetheless went on, in dicta, to do a full Sony-based fair use analysis,
applying the statutory factors with a focus on the potential direct infringers, who
were home garners. 9' The court refused to read Sony narrowly, construing it to
stand for the proposition that a party who distributes a work may not thereafter
dictate how it is enjoyed. The court found home users' activities to be fair use
and, by extension, Galoob could not be guilty of contributory infringement.93
Despite the differences in implementing technologies, the devices in Midway
and Galoob are close functional equivalents which one might expect to receive
similar treatment in infringement actions. The Galoob court's policy favoring
technological innovation in other markets, however, stands in marked contrast to
Midway's policy favoring extension of copyright protection to new technologies.
While system architecture is more important in Galoob's analysis than in Midway's,
the court does not rely entirely on it. By defining the standard for derivative
works infringement to require something akin to a fixation, and emphasizing the
evanescent quality of the Genie's code, Galoob achieves its policy goal.
Add-on manufacturers, at least in the Ninth Circuit, must have been reassured
that the development of game enhancements that did not physically incorporate
any protected material would not present infringement difficulties. However, six
years later, the Ninth Circuit addressed a different technology of game enhance-
ment and refined, or revised, the rules.
By the time Micro Sta?4 reached the Ninth Circuit, yet another variant of
videogame technology had become popular: the computer-based game
distributed in physical copies or over the Internet. Formgen owned the copyright
altered displays were produced by Nintendo's game cartridge. Id at 969.
o Id. at 968-69. The latter distinction is not entirely convincing-Midway had, after all, already
been paid for its machine, including circuit board, just as Nintendo had already been paid for its
console and game cartridge. And while the codes triggering the enhanced displays did not reside
permanently in the Genie itself, they were certainly fixed in the Genie's manual.
9' Id. at 969.
9 Id. at 969-72. Finding family use of the Game Genie to be noncommercial, the court applied
Sonys presumption in favor of fair use in weighing the purpose-of-use factor. Id. On the critical
market impact factor, the court approved the district court's findings that Nintendo had not issued
or considered issuing altered games and had failed to establish the likelihood of such markets, a
finding which appears rather counterfactual given the popularity of the Game Genie itself. Id.
" Id. at 970-72.
9' Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
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in the popular first-person game Duke Nukem. Formgen invited users to create
new levels and post them on the Internet, subject to a license term that such new
levels should not be distributed commercially." Micro Star downloaded 300 of
these user-created levels, which were embodied in MAP files, fixed them on CDs,
and sold them under the name Nuke It. Micro Star, doubtless confident that it
would be protected under Galoob, sought a declaratory judgment that Nuke It did
not infringe Formgen's copyrights in Duke Nukem.96
The critical question on appeal, as in Galoob, was whether the enhancement
was an infringing derivative work. The answer, the court noted (undoubtedly to
Micro Star's surprise) was "not obvious."97 The court focused on the functional-
ity of the MAP files which instructed Formgen's game engine to go to its art
library and create the visual displays for each new level.98 Micro Star argued that
since the MAP files did not incorporate any protected material belonging to
Formgen and the enhanced displays were nowhere captured in concrete form, the
9' Though the fact is not mentioned by the court of appeals, Forngen included a build editor
in its software and provided instructions on how to create new levels and save them as MAP files.
A user must have a registered version of Duke Nukem to use files created with the build editor.
Screen messages frequently reminded users about the editor and encouraged them to share new
levels with friends or upload them to the Internet. See Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 942 F. Supp.
1312-15 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
96 Following what seemed to be the Ninth Circuit's teaching in Galoob, the district court found
that Nuke It was not a derivative work and therefore did not infringe, though the court did find
infringement in Micro Star's use on its packaging of screen shots of the new levels, which displayed
Duke Nukem characters. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1109.
97 Id. at 1110.
9' The Ninth Circuit's description of the technology:
The game consists of three separate components: the game engine, the source
art library and the MAP files. The game engine... tells the computer when to
read data, save and load games, play sounds and project images onto the screen.
In order to create the audiovisual display for a particular level, the game engine
invokes the MAP file that corresponds to that level. Each MAP file contains a
series of instructions that tell the game engine (and, through it, the computer)
what to put where. For instance, the MAP file might say scuba gear goes at the
bottom of the screen. The game engine then goes to the source art library, finds
the image of the scuba gear, and puts it in just the right place on the screen. The
MAP file describes the level in painstaking detail, but it does not actually contain
any of the copyrighted art itself; everything that appears on the screen actually
comes from the art library .... When the player selects one of the N/I levels,
the game engine references the N/I MAP files, but still uses the D/N-3D art
library to generate the images that make up that level.
Id. The court did note that, in actuality, the interaction between the three components involves
communication of instructions, not physical movement of images. Id at n.3.
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protection extended to the Game Genie should likewise shelter Nuke I. 99 The
court disagreed.
Rejecting Micro Star's argument that, like the Game Genie, Nuke It merely
replaced old values (the original MAP files) with new values (Nuke It's MAP
files), 100 the court observed that the MAP files described each new level in great
detail and found such description sufficient to embody the audiovisual displays
in a concrete form.' The court gives us little insight here as to the functional
difference between re-creatable numerical codes stored in print and entered into
the Game Genie to trigger certain displays, and electronic code stored in MAP
files to do precisely the same thing. If the Genie's codes (and combinations
thereof) can be reentered, one could certainly argue that they describe audiovisual
displays quite as completely, though not as efficiently, as Nuke If's MAP files.
Having found a concrete embodiment, the court applied the standard
infringement test. Since the displays triggered by the MAP files were substantially
similar to Formgen's, Nuke Itcreated an infringing derivative work and Micro Star
was a direct, not a contributory, infringer." 2 The court specifically rejected Micro
Star's argument that the MAP files contained no protected expression since they
did not contain the actual art files. 0 3 Having indulged in micro-analysis of the
technology, the court leapt to macro-analysis of content noting that the new story
lines adapted the original story and characters, thereby infringing on Formgen's
rights to control sequels.' In a truncated analysis, the court turned down Micro
9 Id. at 1110-11.
100 Id.
101 The court explained,
whereas the audiovisual displays created by Game Genie were never recorded in
any permanent form, the audiovisual displays generated by D/N-3D from the
N/I MAP files are in the MAP files themselves. In Galoob, the audiovisual
display was defined by the original game cartridge, not by the Game Genie; no
one could possibly say that the data values inserted by the Game Genie described
the audiovisual display. In the present case the audiovisual display that appears
on the computer monitor when a N/I level is played is described-in exact
detail-by a N/I MAP file... an exact, down to the last detail, description of an
audiovisual display.., counts as a permanent or concrete form for purposes of
Galoob.
Id. at 1111-12.
102 Id. Since the displays came from Formgen's art files, they could hardly fail to be substantially
similar. Lydia Loren notes that the court's interpretation basically dispenses with the substantial
similarity test in cases involving add-on enhancements. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Natur
of Deivafive Works in the Face of New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 73-74 (2000).
103 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1112.
104 Id. On its face, this argument appears to be worthier than the technology-based argument the
court primarily relies on, but it creates difficulties of its own because of Formgen's license. Under
current law, the new levels constitute derivative works based on the original game; reproduction or
[Vol. 12:427
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Star's fair use defense, weighing all four factors against Micro Star, with little
discussion of policies favoring innovation or incentives.'
05
The court's analysis glosses over the similarities between the Game Genie and
Nuke It. Like the Game Genie, Micro Star's MAP files constituted programmatic
instructions, not content, and were useless without the plaintiffs original
software. Functionally, they were equivalents in the sense that both products
prompted the original software to produce game enhancements. Moreover, the
code copied by Micro Star, as well as the new story lines it triggered, were created
by users with Formgen's express approval and appear to be authorized derivative
works which Micro Star appropriated from the users. Under the Circuit's test for
derivative works infringement, it is difficult to see how Micro Star could have
been guilty of direct infringement against Formgen.
While Midway can be readily distinguished on the basis of literal copying, the
Ninth Circuit cases are not easily reconciled. Both the Game Genie and the MAP
files are integrated works which interact with original works to change the user's
experience of the original.'l 6 The divergent results in the cases seem to indicate
that an add-on manufacturer's potential liability for infringement may be entirely
dependent on the precise mechanism employed for storage and retrieval of data,
in violation of the principle of media neutrality.
public performance of a derivative work would also constitute reproduction or performance of the
original. However, Formgen authorized users to create and distribute those levels, raising the
question whether Micro Star could, then, be liable to Formgen for merely triggering authorized
displays. The court specifically refused to view Micro Star as the beneficiary of the users' license to
create newlevels and rejected the argument that Formgen had abandoned its rights by licensing users
to create and distribute their own levels. Id. at 1113-14. While Formgen may have abandoned its
right to create and distribute new levels, the court held, it had not abandoned its exclusive right to
commercially exploit those levels. Id. It is worth noting that while rights to adapt and distribute
works are among those specifically granted to the copyright owner under Section 106, a separate
right to commercial exploitation is not, though Jessica Litman has suggested that a generalized right
to commercial exploitation might, in fact, be a more workable formulation than the reproduction
right. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 180 (2001). Additionally,
the conclusion that triggering appearance of the characters and story lines in enhanced levels
constitutes infringement may be somewhat at odds not only with Galob (because Nuke It merely
provides instructions leading to the recreation of the levels), but also with the court's later decision
in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (9th
Cir. 2000), holding that creation of an software emulator which permitted users to play Sony
Playstation games on their computers, instead of on Sony's console, was a permissible fair use.
Connectix focused on the intermediate copying necessary to reverse engineer the console's BIOS
software, rather than on enhancements of game play. See id. However, Micro Stars inference that
simply triggering display of the game characters and story lines is infringement would seem to
preclude the use of an emulator to literally produce game displays on a different machine.
'0 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1112.
106 Loren, supra note 102, at 59.
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The reliance on frnely-drawn distinctions between different storage and
retrieval technologies resurfaces in different contexts in the database compilation
and file sharing cases. The contributory infringement arguments appearing in
Midway and Galoob, but short-circuited by the court's finding of direct infringe-
ment in Micro Star, also reappear in these later cases as the courts struggle with the
relationships between copyright owners, technology providers, and end users.
B. DATABASE PRODUCTS-DEFINITIONS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETAIL
The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Tasin °7 is the
centerpiece of this set of cases. Two circuit court cases, Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publishing Co.'"8 and Greenberg v. Naional Geographic Sodeo,' °" decided after the
lower court opinions in Tasini but prior to the Supreme Court's decision, are also
notable. Finally, the very recent opinion in Faulkner v. NationalGeographic Sodeoy"°
interprets Tasini to produce a result somewhat at odds with Greenberg. Tasini,
Greenberg, and Faulkner involve the relative rights of authors and publishers of
individual, copyrighted works compiled in collective works"' such as newspapers
and magazines. Matthew Bender involves claims between competing compilation
publishers.
In Tasini, freelance authors of articles published in the New York Times,
Newsday, and Sports Illustrated claimed that their copyrights were infringed by
the print publishers' licensing of rights to electronic publishers who included the
articles in electronic databases online and on CD."2 All three print publishers
licensed Lexis-Nexis to reproduce and sell the articles on its NEXIS service." 3
The New York Times, additionally, authorized inclusion of its issues on two CD
products: the New York Times OnDisc (NYTO) and General Publications
OnDisc (GPO)." 4 The authors received no additional compensation for these
republications of their works."'
107 533 U.S. 483, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2003).
10s 158 F.3d 693,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (2d Cir. 1998).
109 244 F.3d 1267, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
110 294 F. Supp. 2d 523, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
m" Collective works, like anthologies and periodicals, collect a number of separate and
independent works into a collective whole. The broader term "compilation" also denotes works
formed by the collection of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.
The term "compilation" includes collective works. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The periodicals in Tasini
constituted both compilations and collective works. 533 U.S. 483.
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Compilers receive copyright protection for their compilations only as to
original elements such as commentaries, selection, and arrangement, which they
add to the underlying works gathered in the compilation." 6 Additionally, section
201 (c) of the Copyright Act provides:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series'17
As none of the freelancers in Tasini had expressly transferred their rights,"' the
statutory presumption applied and the court's opinion focused on whether the
electronic republications constituted permissible revisions of the original
collective works or were, instead, infringements of the freelancers' rights in their
individual articles. The manner in which the electronic products stored and
retrieved the articles turned out to be determinative.
NEXIS and NYTO both provided text-only information. The same electronic
files used to print the text of the hard copy publications were sent to the
electronic publishers, who coded them to facilitate electronic searches." 9 NEXIS
added them to its extensive databases, while NYTO accumulated issues of the
New York Times on CDs. Both products employed familiar search-and-retrieval
methods, producing displays only of individual articles, with references to source
but no surrounding context from the original publication. GPO, on the other
hand, was image-based, containing exact reproductions of the printed New York
Times Book Review and Sunday Magazine, as well as of other publications.
Searches, however, produced displays only of the pages related to the individual
articles retrieved. 20
16 The underlying works must be used with permission of the author or the compiler receives
no copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2002).
117 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
n" Publisher claims that documents such as endorsed checks which served as copyright transfers
did not survive the lower courts. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 489 n.1.
119 Id. at 489-90.
120 GPO's image-based discs were not themselves searchable but were accompanied by
searchable text-based discs providing an index and abstracts of articles: Users could search the
abstracts, identify articles of interest, then return to the image-based discs to retrieve the articles. See
Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 808-09, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The district court opinion provides more detail than the Supreme Court opinion
regarding the workings of the various publications.
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Noting that Congress specifically designed section 201(c) to correct inequitable
treatment of authors under the prior Copyright Act of 1909,121 the majority
opinion found that the electronic publishers had clearly exercised the reproduc-
tion and distribution rights of the freelancers unless their activities fell within the
revision privilege." In determining whether the electronic reproductions were
revisions, the majority focused on the articles as presented to and perceived by the
users, citing the statutory definitions of the terms "copies" and "fixed" with their
focus on media from which works can be perceived, reproduced, or communi-
cated.1
23
Since all three databases presented users with the individual articles without
the surrounding context of the original periodicals, the majority opinion did not
consider the electronic versions to be revisions of the original compilation.'24
Rather, it viewed the retrieved articles either as individual works or, alternatively,
as parts of a new collective work, the database itself. In either case, the publishers
had exceeded the scope of the revision privilege and infringed the freelancers'
rights to reproduction and distribution.
125
The publishers specifically cited the doctrine of media neutrality, arguing that
mere transfer into another medium should not affect the revision privilege.
26
The majority opinion, however, distinguished conversion of intact periodicals
from one medium to another from the databases' separation of the periodicals
into individual articles. "[M]edia neutrality should protect the Authors' rights in
the individual Articles to the extent those Articles are now presented individually,
outside the collective work context, within the Databases' new media."'
27
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that users could manipulate the database
121 Prior to enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the copyright of a contributor to a collective
work was recognized only if the collective work contained a separate copyright notice in the
contributor's name. Under the former doctrine of indivisibility, the author could not transfer only
the limited right to reproduce and distribute in the collective publication but must transfer his
copyright in its entirety. If the collective work carried only the publisher's copyright notice, the
author's copyright fell into the public domain. Publishers often refused to carry separate notices,
placing the author's copyright at risk, and forcing the author to transfer the entire copyright.
Congress sought to remedy this imbalance of power by providing for division of the copyright into
discrete rights, each of which could be separately transferred by either exclusive or nonexclusive
licenses, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(c), dispensing with the requirement for separate notices for each
contributor, see 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2000), and specifically limiting the compiler to the privileges
established in section 201 (c) absent an express transfer of rights. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 494-97.
122 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500.
123 Id. at 498-99. The term "revision" is not defined in the statute.
124 Id at 499-501.
125 Id
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to produce an exact replica of the original periodical, observing that the fact that
a third party could manipulate the data to produce a noninfringing document did
not absolve the publishers from infringement. 128 Nor did Sony's staple article of
commerce doctrine shelter them from claims of infringement since the publishers
did not merely supply enabling technology to their users, but directly infringed by
creating and distributing actual copies themselves.
29
The majority opinion viewed the electronic files captured on the databases as
copies fixed in a tangible medium of expression 130 and their presentation to users
as a distribution of copies of individual articles. Justice Stevens' dissent, on the
other hand, started from the intermediate batches periodically transferred by the
print publishers to the electronic publishers rather than from the content as
stored on the database or ultimately presented to database users.
The dissent analyzed three separate steps: the conversion from print to
electronic format, the transfer of electronic files, and the incorporation of the files
into the database.' Justice Stevens found that the text files created by the print
publishers for NEXIS and NYTO constituted revisions of each affected issue of
the publication.'32 Citing the principle of media neutrality, he argued that
conversion of the collective works into separate electronic files merely reflected
the different nature of the electronic medium, which required that the works be
broken down into smaller, less memory-intensive units.'33 Justice Stevens accused
the majority of backing away from media neutrality by requiring that articles
appear in context.' In essence, his approach would require that any changes
dictated by change of medium should not count toward infringement under the
media neutrality principle.
128 Id. at 504.
129 Id.
130 The majority opinion observed that Lexis's central discs and the CD products themselves
reproduced copies of the articles. See id. at 498.
131 Id. at 511. See infra Part IV, observing that, in fact, the content was not converted from print
to electronic format, but existed electronically prior to either print or electronic publication.
132 Id. at 512-14.
133 Id. at 514 n. 11. The majority opinion correctly observed that while this may be true, the
separation into individual files also reflected the economic market. Id at 502 n.11. The dissent
noted that the New York Times certainly could "reprint its issues in Braille, in a foreign language,
or in microform [and any resulting] differences would ... largely result from the different mediums
being employed." Id. at 512-13. Justice Stevens' references to translations into foreign languages
and Braille, which are not physical media, but are modes of expression, indicate that he viewed media
neutrality as encompassing more than mere indifference to physical storage media. See id. at 512-13.
Translation to Braille would both create a derivative work (translation to a different language) and
transfer the work to a new physical medium (raised bumps on paper).
134 Id. at 512-15.
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In his view, if the electronic files constituted revisions, the mere transfer and
commingling of those files with other materials in the electronic publishers'
databases should not change that result any more than would the placement of a
single edition of the New York Times in a physical library, since each individual
article reminded the reader that it was part of a collective whole.3 ' The
publishers could not, therefore, be guilty of direct infringement and, if their users
chose to infringe, the publishers should be protected under Sony from contribu-
tory liability.
136
In both Tasini opinions, the close readings of the statutory term "revision"
recall the definitional approach in White-Smith, while the detailed descriptions of
electronic systems resemble those in Mio Star. Both opinions rely extensively on
analogies to microform and library collections of multiple issues of the same
work, recognizing that such collections appear to constitute permissible revisions
but reaching opposite conclusions as to the lessons to be taken from these
analogies.'
37
The majority focuses so exclusively on the particular technologies at hand that
it provides little guidance as to what kind of electronic version, if any, would
qualify as a revision. It is not entirely clear how much context must be repro-
duced or whether periodical issues (compilations in themselves) can be cumulated
though the references, in dicta, to microforms may indicate that such cumulation
is acceptable. 3  To date, two opinions involving the same electronic collections
of issues of National Geographic magazine have reached conflicting results.
Greenberg v. Naional Geographic Sociey, 13' an Eleventh Circuit opinion rendered
before the Supreme Court's decision in Tasini, rejected a revision right claim for
an image-based CD library of issues of the National Geographic magazine which
preserved full context."4 The Greenberg court held that transformation to an
135 Id. at 516-17.
136 Id at 518.
137 Because microforms reproduce images of the complete issues, the majority uses the analogy
to bolster its view that articles produced without full context are not revisions. Id. at 501-02. The
dissent uses the microform analogy to suggest that collection of multiple issues is well-accepted and
that presentation of individual articles is necessitated only by medium change. See id. at 512-13.
Consequently, a media neutral ruling should not distinguish between the microforms and databases
as acceptable revisions. Id.
13 If not, even a microform accumulating editions of a publication would not constitute a
revision, and it is difficult to imagine any economically viable electronic version of a print publication
that would qualify. See Amir A. Naini, Note, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 9, 21, 22 (2002).
19 244 F.3d 1267.
140 Greenberg was a freelance photographer whose work appeared in several issues of National
Geographic magazine. He retained the copyright in his photographs. The collection not only
replicated his photos, but used one in a new "moving covers" sequence, which the court separately
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electronic medium and addition of an introductory sequence and search and
retrieval software created an entirely new product for a new market. This product
was a new collective work, not a revision. The addition of the introductory
sequence, which created an unauthorized derivative of one of the plaintiffs
photographs, distinguishes the case from Tasini. However, the Greenberg court
raised the possibility, in dictum, that mere addition of independently copyrightable
material such as software might be sufficient to create a new collective work. 4'
In Faulkner v. Naional Geographic Sodey, 142 the court addressed nearly identical
claims brought by freelance contributors and roundly rejected the Greenber
decision in light of Tasini.'43 The Faulkner court read the legislative history as
contrary to the Greenberg view that mere addition of new material to a collection
of issues of the same publication was inconsistent with the revision privilege.
44
Focusing on Tasin's requirement of presentation in context, the lower court
interpreted the Supreme Court's discussion of microform as an indirect blessing
for collections of issues of the same periodical presented in full context.145 Since
the National Geographic products were based on scanned images of the original
publications and presented the issues to the user in full context, the court held
them to be permissible revisions of the original magazines.146
found to be an infruiiging derivative work. Id. at 1274. The CD library permitted the user to print
out the image of any page of the magazine, but did not allow the user to separate the photographs
from the text or to edit the pages in any way. Id. at 1269.
141 Id. at 1273. The court observed that the replica of the archived issues was unusable without
the addition of the program permitting search and retrieval, itself a copyrightable work. The court
raised, but did not decide in the context of the case, the question whether addition of software to
a work, standing alone, would create a new collective work. Id. at 1273 n.12. One commentator
observes that, if the addition of software to content inevitably creates a new collective work, much
of the Tasini majority's opinion, with its insistence on context, would be entirely superfluous since
the operation of the databases inevitably required software in addition to the original content of the
publications. SeeJennifer L. Livingston, Note, Digital 'Revision": Greenberg v. National Geographic
Society, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1419, 1437 (2002).
142 294 F. Supp. 2d 523.
143 The plaintiffs were freelance photographers or writers who created images or text that
originally appeared in the print version of the NaionalGeograpbic Magarne. They alleged that unpaid
use of their works in an electronic collection of multiple issues of the magazine-the Complete
National Geographic collection also challenged in Greenbeg-violated their copyrights. None of the
plaintiffs' works appeared in the introductory sequence, as did Greenberg's work, so their claim was
based entirely on translation of the collected magazine issues to electronic format. Id. at 525-26. The
court found that the defendants were not collaterally estopped by the Greenberg decision because the
intervening decision in Tasini changed the applicable legal doctrine. Id. at 537-38.
'44 Id. at 539.
141 Id. at 541.
146 Id. at 540-43.
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The court further rejected the plaintiffs' argument, based on Greenberg, that the
electronic works were entirely new works for a new market, and therefore not
revisions, observing that all revisions are new products and mere change of
medium is irrelevant "as media neutrality is a fundamental principle of the
Copyright Act."'4 7 The court interpreted Tasini to require that freelancers be
protected only where there is demand for a freestanding article or a "new
collection" rather than a revision. 148 While the Faulknerinterpretation may accord
with the Supreme Court's dictum regarding microform reproductions, it runs
against the underlying policy argument, based on the legislative history, favoring
fair payment to freelancers. Like its predecessor opinions, Faulkner relies
primarily on technological distinctions to support its result.
In a different context, the Second Circuit took a somewhat more balanced
approach to database compilations in Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing
Co.'49 Nonetheless, its judgment rests primarily on technical interpretation of the
statutory definitions of copies and fixation. Unlike Tasini, Matthew Bender dealt
directly with claims of secondary liability for infringement by electronic products
of competing publishers. But like the Tasini majority, the Matthew Bender court
focused on the information as presented to users by a search-and-retrieval system.
West claimed that its selection and arrangement of its case reporters was
infringed by competitors' use of star pagination' 5° in case reports contained on
CD products.' West argued that the CDs were infringing copies because users
might, for entirely unimaginable reasons, utilize the page break information to
recreate West's reporters, making the competitors contributory infringers.'52 The
only arguably protected element of West's reporters was its arrangement of the
individual case reports in each reporter.'53 Matthew Bender's CDs, and those of
an intervenor, Hyperlaw, contained considerable information in addition to the
147 Id. at 541.
148 Id. at 542.
149 158 F.3d 693,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (2d Cir. 1998).
150 Star pagination reveals every page break in the report so that users can correctly cite to the
location of particular text.
151 Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 700-02.
152 Id. West's claim was complicated by the fact that it had previously admitted that use of the
beginning page number of each case was fair use. See id. The court was not convinced that mere
addition of the page break numbering transformed a fair use into an infringement. See id.
153 The page numbers themselves, inserted automatically in the printing process, were
insufficiently original or creative to receive copyright protection. Id. at 699. Interestingly, the court
observed in a footnote that the same result would be reached using a medium-based argument. Id.
at 699 n.9. Intangible works, the court said, are protected only when fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, but that does not mean that elements of a particular medium, like pagination, which are
not themselves part of the intangible work, receive protection. Id.
[Vol. 12:427
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contested case reports and were arranged differently." 4 The search and retrieval
system listed and displayed individual case reports only. Since the CDs did not
fix West's particular selection and arrangement in their databases or make them
perceptible to users, the court held they did not create actionable copies of West's
reporters.15 The mere possibility that users might rearrange the case opinions as
presented to them by Matthew Bender was not sufficient excuse for enjoining a
manifestly useful service under Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine.'
5 6
The court specifically discussed media neutrality, finding that West's
redefinition of the term "copy" to include potential rearrangements by users in
the electronic context would run contrary to the principle of media neutrality. 57
Unlike the court in Greenberg, the MathewBendercourt engaged in a more thorough
discussion of underlying policy issues. 5 8 Nonetheless, its judgment ultimately
rests, like the judgment in White-Smith, on its technology-based determination of
what is or is not a copy, thereby avoiding the rather more interesting question
whether West's arrangement is sufficiently original to be protected at all.
159
In all of the database cases, the courts' judgments depend in large part on close
readings of statutory definitions applied to the specific workings of storage and
retrieval technologies, with a focus on the manner in which the systems present
data to users. Tasini, in particular, draws a technology-based line between analog
compilations and their electronic counterparts based on their different
functionalities. The majority and dissent diverge entirely in their interpretations
of the meaning of media neutrality as well as their applications of the principle in
context.
The Sony theme of allocation of liability between technology providers and
users runs like an undercurrent through the Tasini opinion, but surfaces rarely
154 West state reporters are arranged by region, state, chronology, and court (with variations in
different reporter series). Matthew Bender's CDs contained only New York opinions in
chronological order and added statutory and secondary materials. Hyperlaw's CDs also added many
cases not published by West, in roughly chronological order. Id. at 697-98. Because of the additional
materials in both CDs, infringement of West's selection was not a serious issue.
155 Id. at 700-02.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 702-04.
15' The court discusses generally the importance of the originality requirement, the failings of the
defunct "sweat of the brow" school of copyright protection, and the inadvisability of allowing West
to leverage control of pagination into control of the public domain information contained in its
reporters. Id. at 702-04.
159 Consequently, the court's analysis, like Tasin's, leaves some unanswered questions since, by
inference, a CD which could be directly read by a device which renders a protected arrangement
perceptible without user intervention would infringe on West's arrangement. See Deborah Tussey,
The Creative as Enemy of the True: The Meaning of Originai y in the Matthew Bender Cases, 5 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 10, para. 44, 45 (1999).
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given the majority's determination that the publishers directly infringed. The
issue takes center stage, however, in the peer-to-peer file sharing cases. In
Napster, the Ninth Circuit faced the issue directly and again produced a
technology-centered judgment. 160 Napster would probably have lost under any
circumstances, but under the court's analysis, it most clearly lost because it used
a central server.
C. PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING-WRITING TECHNOLOGY INTO THE RULES
While Napster raises many issues, I concentrate here on the architectural
aspects of the case. Napster has now been succeeded by two similar cases, In re
AimsterCopyright'Lifgation"' and Metro-Goldwyn-MayerStudios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,62
the latter of which demonstrates the impact of Napsters technology-centered
analysis. The Aimster decision, while imperfect, demonstrates a more media-
neutral, balanced approach.
Napster was the first popular peer-to-peer file sharing system. The service
provided its registered users with software and continuing services' 63 which
permitted them to exchange music files in "MP3" format64 over the Internet,
thereby facilitating widespread infringement of copyrighted works. Napster
managed these functions through a centralized server system which, critically,
gave Napster the ability to block certain users and remove infringing material;
Napster itself never copied or distributed music files nor did it serve as a conduit
for file transfer by its users. 165 Napster's situation was thus distinguishable from
that of MP3.com, which had previously been found liable for direct infringement
because it actively copied a library of CDs into MP3 format and served them up
to its online subscribers.'6 6 That Napster users did engage in direct infringement
160 239 F.3d 1004.
161 334 F.3d 643, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (7th Cit. 2003).
162 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1579 (C.D. Cal. 2003) [hereinafter Grokster 1],
affd, 380 F.3d 1154, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (9th Cit. 2004) [hereinafter Grokster Il, cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
163 Napster supplemented its "MusicShare" software with a user directory, a searchable index of
available titles, a hotlist function, and chat rooms. Napster also provided the Internet addresses
necessary for users to contact each other and exchange files. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
" MP3 (short for MPEG-3) is a digital file format. "Ripping" software compresses audio data
from a CD onto the user's hard drive, facilitating subsequent transfer through email or any file
transfer protocol. See id. at 1011. Compression using MP3 technology marginally reduces sound
quality, but the reduction is undetectable by most listeners.
16s Id. at 1011-23, 1024.
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was undisputed on appeal; 6 ' the court's inquiry focused on Napster's secondary
liability.
Under the traditional test, a contributory infringer is one who knows or has
reason to know of its users' infringements and induces, causes, or materially
contributes to them.'68 Under Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine, the
court must additionally determine whether the defendant's product is capable of
substantial noninfringing uses that might immunize it from liability, striking a
balance between the copyright holder's legal monopoly and the rights of others
to engage in unrelated areas of commerce. 69 Establishment of a fair use defense
supports the existence of a substantial noninfringing use.' The Ninth Circuit
found that the staple article of commerce doctrine was relevant only to the
contributory infringement claim, reading the Supreme Court's uses of the term
vicarious liability in Sony as generic references to secondary forms of liability.'
The appellate court corrected the lower court's holding that Napster had no
substantial noninfringing uses, finding that the district court gave insufficient
consideration to potential, as opposed to actual, noninfringing uses." 2 Reading
Sony only in relation to the knowledge requirement for contributory infringement,
the court held that the requisite level of knowledge could not be imputed to
Napster merely because its architecture permitted infringement if the system also
had existing or potential commercially significant noninfringinguses.' The court
found itself "compelled to make a clear distinction between the architecture of the
Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of
the system. '  In a somewhat murky passage, the court observed that if a
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available on its
system and fails to purge such material, the operator knows of and contributes to
direct infringement.7 5  Since Napster did have actual knowledge of specific
infringing material on its system,7 6 could have blocked access to the system by
167 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
168 Id. at 1019-20 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162,170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182,184-85 (2d Cit. 1971)); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
76 F.3d 259, 264, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1594 (9th Cit. 1996).
169 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
170 Id.
171 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-23.
172 I. at 1021.
173 Id. at 120-21. Sony found no precedent for basing vicarious liability on constructive knowledge
that users of a copying device might infringe, where the device also had noninfringing uses. Sony,
464 U.S. at 439.
174 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
175 Id. at 1021-22.
176 The circuit court placed the burden on the music industry to notify Napster that specific
infringing material was being exchanged by its users and found, on the facts of the case, that Napster
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suppliers of the infringing material, and failed to purge the material, it was
contributorily liable notwithstanding Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine.
1 77
With respect to the requirement of material contribution, the court relied on
its earlier precedent holding a swap meet organizer responsible for infringement
by vendors. 178 The court found that users could not easily engage in infringing file
sharingwithout Napster's services and Napster's central servers provided the "site
and facilities" for, and materially contributed to, their infringements.7 9
Consequently, Sony offered no shelter against contributory liability.'
80
Vicarious liability requires a showing that the defendant has the right and
ability to supervise the infringing activity and benefits financially from it.'8 ' In
Napster, the court found financial benefit based on evidence showing that, even
though Napster did not charge for its services, the increased user base resulting
from infringement was essential to its future profitability. 82  Its centralized
architecture was, again, determinative of its duty to police its users. Napster
specifically retained the right to control access to its system and, through its
servers, could both block certain users and remove infringing materials,
demonstrably possessing the right and ability to supervise its "premises."' 83 The
court did observe that Napster's duty to police its premises was not unlimited, but
was "cabined by the system's current architecture."' 84 The system could not read
the content of indexed files, other than to check that they were in the proper MP3
format, but, once notified of infringement, Napster could have used its indexing
function to find and remove offending material and failed to do so.' 85 Conse-
quently, Napster was vicariously liable.'86
The court rejected Napster's claim that its users were engaged in fair use,
under Sony, because they used the service for substantial noninfringing uses such
as permissive use of recordings by some artists, 87 sampling music prior to
purchase, and space-shifting by accessing works in MP3 format that they already
had actual knowledge of its users' infringements. Id. at 1020-22.
177 Id.
17 See Fonavisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (holding a swap meet organizer contributorily and vicariously liable
for the distribution of infringing recordings by participants).
171 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
185 Id. at 1020-22.
181 Id. at 1022.
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owned in CD format,'8 8 which the Ninth Circuit approved in Recording Indusry
Ass'n of American v. Diamond Mulimedia Systems, Inc.'89 Emphasizing the harm to
plaintiffs' present and future markets for online music distribution, the court
found that all four fair use factors weighed against Napster 9 ° Sony and Diamond
were inapposite, the court held, because the methods of shifting approved therein
did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the
general public, but exposed the material only to the original user.' 9'
The Ninth Circuit required that the district court's preliminary injunction be
narrowed on remand, but affirmed its issuance.'92 Ultimately the district court,
as part of its injunction against and subsequent monitoring of Napster, imposed
a partially architectural remedy: the use of filtering software to block infringing
materials. 193  The functional inadequacies of that solution and Napster's
consequent inability to comply with the court's zero tolerance policy eventually
resulted in shutdown of the service.
94
The Napster opinion targets two key elements: the peer-to-peer provider's
actual knowledge of specific infringements by users and its structural ability to
control them. While the appellate ruling appropriately narrowed the impact of the
district court's ruling, it did so by relying heavily on Napster's particular
architecture, seemingly reading Napster's functional limitations into the
knowledge requirement for contributory liability by requiring actual knowledge
of specific acts as well as the ability to block infringing material. Perhaps more
importantly, it gives greater weight to its interpretation of the knowledge
188 Id. at 1014.
189 180 F.3d 1072, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). Space-shifting is an extension of
Sony's time-shifting rationale. The Diamond court found that the Rio MP3 player, a transportable
device which stored and played back music files downloaded from users' hard drives, had a
substantial non-infringing use, space-shifting lawfully obtained works so they could be enjoyed in
different locations. Diamotdwas decided under the Audio Home RecordingAct (AHRA), 17 U.S.C.
§ 1001-1008, not the 1976 Copyright Act. The Napstercourt separately rejected claims that Napster
was sheltered by safe harbors under the AHRA (for home audio taping) and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (for online service providers). See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024, 1025.
190 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-19.
191 Id. at 1019.
192 Id. at 1029.
193 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05138 MHP, COO-1 369 MPH, 2001 WL
227083 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
194 As directed by the court of appeals, the district court also required the recording industry to
notify Napster of specific infringements. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2002) (approving the district court's modification of its preliminary injunction to impose the filtering
requirement and, when compliance proved less than perfect, to shut Napster down). Napster has
now been resurrected as a paid, and royalty-paying, subscription service. See http://www.napster.
com (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
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requirement than it does to its fair use analysis, undermining Sony's emphasis on
balancing incentives against innovation."
95
By relying so heavily on system architecture, the court issued an open
invitation to the burgeoning peer-to-peer industry to design systems that negated
one or both of the requirements for secondary liability. The industry met the
challenge with alacrity by shifting to decentralized peer-to-peer systems such as
Gnutella and its successors. 96 Some providers also adopted the use of encryption
to shield user transactions not only from copyright owners, but from the
providers themselves, in hopes of avoiding the knowledge required for contribu-
tory infringement.'97
These next-generation file sharing systems, specifically designed to avoid
Napster's fate, were challenged by copyright owners in Grokster 1.19" The
defendants, Grokster and Streamcast, distributed two different kinds of file
sharing software. Both platforms provided connection to a peer-to-peer network,
lists of online users and available files, communication with other users, and
features for organizing and playing the shared files. Neither allowed its distributor
to control the file sharing network.'9 9 The district court did its best to apply
195 But see In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643,649, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233,1237
(7th Cir. 2003), rejecting this approach. Goldstein observes that the purposes of the knowledge
requirement and of the substantial, noninfringing use requirement are different and that Napster's
emphasis undermines Sony's purpose to prevent the effective extension of copyright monopolies
over unrelated consumer goods or devices. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, 1 6:12-1 (2d
ed. 2003).
196 The earliest decentralized file sharing system, Gnutella, was so radically decentralized that it
suffered from stability and performance problems. Gnutella was soon succeeded by improved
versions, as well as by the FastTrack protocol and its client application Kazaa. Unlike Gnutella,
which is an open source protocol, FastTrack was licensed out to companies like Grokster and rapidly
became the most successful file sharing protocol after the demise of Napster. Unlike Gnutella,
FastTrack centralizes certain functions, such as user registration and logins, but, like Gnutella, it
separates the communication protocol from the client software so that services like Grokster have
no ability to regulate or shut down the peer-to-peer network. See Wu, supra note 55, at 730-37 for
a summary of the development of decentralized peer-to-peer systems.
197 See infra text accompanying notes 219-37; see also BrawlOverFik-swapping Spawns 'Secur'Software,
SILICONVALLEY.COM, July 24, 2003, at http://www.siliconvafley.com/mld/siliconvaley/news/
editorial/6374384.htm (last visited Apr. 3,2005), reporting that, in response to suits by the recording
industry against peer-to-peer users, software providers upgraded their programs to protect users'
privacy by masking their identities from Recording Industry Association ofAmerica (RIAA) sleuths.
198 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029. The plaintiffs in two consolidated cases represented the motion picture
and recording industries, music publishers, and songwriters. Id. at 1031-32. The defendants were
three distributors of file sharing software-Grokster, Streamcast Networks, and Kazaa-although
Kazaa was not a party to the motions for summary judgment addressed in the case. See id.
199 Grokster distributed a branded version of the Kazaa Media Desktop based on FastTrack while
Streamcast offered its own proprietary software, Morpheus, based on the open-source Gnutella
protocol. Id. at 1032-33. Grokster's system was not centralized, but operated through a variable
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Napster's enhanced standard for contributory liability, producing an interpretation
that was in accord with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the legal standards,
but, entirely because of technological differences in the file sharing systefi s,
exonerated the defendants from any contributory or vicarious liability.20
°
Regarding the contributory infringement claim, the court found significant
evidence of substantial noninfringing use to share non-copyrighted or permissive
material.20 ' Consequently, under Napstes interpretation of Sony, defendants must
have actual knowledge of specific infringements at a time when they also
materially contributed to the infringement and had the ability to stop it.2 °2
The architecture of the two systems proved determinative. The court found
a "seminal distinction" between the decentralized systems and Napster.2 3 While
the defendants had general knowledge of their users' infringements, they did not
have actual knowledge of specific infringements and did not facilitate the
exchange of files between users in the way Napster did.' ° In fact, if either
defendant shut down, users of their products could continue sharing files with
little or no interruption. 2°" Analogizing the defendants' software to the home
VCR or the photocopier, the court held that routine technical assistance to and
the ability to communicate with users were not sufficiently substantial to
constitute material contribution to the alleged infringement.2 6
With regard to the claim of vicarious infringement, the court found financial
benefit based on increased subscriber bases and advertising revenues, but the
architecture defeated the plaintiffs' attempts to prove that defendants' had the
right and ability to control user activities.20 7 Napster, the court observed, offered
series of "supernodes"-users' computers with temporarily heightened functionality. A user's node
might be a supemode one day and not the next, depending on resource needs and availability of the
network. "Root" supernodes directed users to active supemodes. Grokster itself did not control
a supemode, nor were its computers involved in any way in file transfers-the service simply
provided users with a start page and pushed advertising. Morpheus was even more decentralized
than Grokster's FastTrack-based system. Users of the software contacted publicly available
directories of online users, none of them operated by Streamcast, and passed search requests from
user to user until a match was found. Id. at 1039-41. Since the plaintiffs' sought preliminary
injunctive relief, the court addressed only the defendants' current systems, not claims that they had
previously operated supernodes or centralized systems. Id. at 1033.
o See id.
Streamcast produced evidence regarding distribution of movie trailers, free sample songs,
public domain works, permissive distribution, and free software. See idi at 1034-35.
202 See id. at 1036-37.
m' Id at 1041.
204 Id. at 1041-43.
20s Id. at 1041.
206 Id. at 1042-43.
207 See id at 1043-46.
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an integrated system of software and hardware, controlling its own network.2 °8
Here, however, defendants provided software that communicated across
networks entirely outside their control.2 9 Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that
the software should be redesigned to filter out offending materials, the court
observed that vicarious liability did not extend so far as to make providers
responsible for product redesign in the absence of any showing that they had
control over users.210
While the district court recognized the probability that the defendants
intentionally designed around the requirements for secondary liability, it declined
to expand existing copyright law in the absence of legislative guidance, citing
Sony's policy of caution when confronted with innovative technologies not
anticipated by Congress.2 ' The Ninth Circuit granted expedited review of the
Grokster I decision"' and, somewhat surprisingly in light of the consequences,
strongly affirmed both the Napster interpretation of contributory and vicarious
infringement and the district court's application of it to decentralized services.
2 3
The court found the systems capable of substantial noninfringing uses, such as
direct artist-to-user distribution and distribution of public domain works,
observing that even ten percent usage for non-infringing activities represented
hundreds of thousands of legitimate transactions.21 4 Consequently, the court held,
the plaintiffs must show that the defendants had knowledge of specific infringe-
ments at a time when they could control their users' activities and went on to say,
"[i]n the context of this case, the software design is of great import., 21 5 The
absence of a central server or any control by defendants of index files precluded
satisfaction of either the knowledge or material contribution elements of
contributory infringement.1 6 The defendants could not be said, given the
architecture of their systems, to offer the "site and facilities" for infringement.1 7
For purposes of vicarious liability, the defendants did not possess the technologi-
cal control necesssary to block users from the networks." 8 In the Ninth Circuit,
centralized and decentralized filesharing systems receive differing treatment under
208 Id. at 1038.
Id at 1044-45.
210 Id. at 1045-46.
211 Id. at 1046.
212 See Appeals Court to Expedite Review of File sharing Suit, SiliconValley.com, July 17, 2003, at
http://www.sihiconvaley.com/mld/siliconvauey/news/editorial/63 2 7 134.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2005).
213 GroksterII, 380 F.3d at 1155.
214 Id. at 1162.
215 Id. at 1163.
216 See id.
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copyright law, in apparent contravention of the principle of media neutrality, to
which the court makes no reference whatsoever.
The Aimster decision,219 written by Judge Posner, offers a useful counterpoint
to Napsterand GroksterII. Aimster allowed users to exchange music files through
instant messaging services. Like Napster, Aimster utilized a central server. All
communications over the service were encrypted using software provided by
Aimster in what the court obviously viewed as a deliberate attempt to shield
Aimster's operators from the knowledge required for contributory liability.2 ° The
court likened the service to a stock exchange, offering a facility for matching
offers, rather than a repository of the things being exchanged, but noted that,
unlike stock transactions, music file exchanges did not take place in the facility,
that is, in Aimster's server.22 '
In an opinion centered on its interpretation of Son, the court attempted to
steer a middle course between extreme claims from both parties: that a single
infringement created secondary liability, on the one hand, or that a single
noninfringing use immunized against it, on the other. 2 The court recognized
that instant messaging services might be used for noninfringing purposes.223
While agreeing with the recording industry's argument that providers of services,
unlike sellers of devices, retained an ability to control their customers' activities
which must be considered in the infringement analysis, the court rejected the
industry's claim that ability to control was determinative.224 If the detection and
prevention of the infringing uses would be highly burdensome to a service with
substantial noninfringing uses, the plaintiffs' interpretation could result in the
shutting down of the service or its annexation by the copyright owners, contrary
to policies established in Sony. The court specifically rejected the Napster court's
holding that a facilitator's actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a
sufficient condition for contributory infringement, citing Son's refusal to protect
copyright owners against new technologies at the price of denying that technology
to noninfringing consumers.
22s
219 In reAimster, 334 F.3d 643.
220 The Aimster system consisted of proprietary software downloaded free from its Web site, a
central server, computerized tutorials, and "Club Aimster," a subscription service which made it
easier for users to download the most popular music files more easily than by using the basic, free
service. The central server hosted Aimster's Web site, indexed user information, and provided
search and retrieval capabilities allowing users to find and exchange files: It did not copy the
swapped files. Aimster users could share files only when online and connected in a chat room
enabled by an instant-messaging service. Id. at 646-47.
221 Id. at 647.
2 See id. at 651.
221 Id. at 647.
224 Id. at 648.
2-" Id. at 648-49.
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Crafting a more nuanced approach to contributory infringement, the court
observed that when a product or service has demonstrable, substantial,
noninfringing as well as infringing uses, courts must balance the respective
magnitudes of the uses, considering both actual and potential uses. 226 The mere
potential for some noninfringing use is not sufficient to defeat contributory
liability, but neither is anything more than a mere showing of infringing use
sufficient to negate the Sony defense. 227 The plaintiffs' evidence amply supported
infringing uses, shifting the burden to Aimster to establish actual or potential
2281 ononinfringing uses. Alas for Aimster, it had produced no evidence at all of
noninfringing use by its customers. 9 The court held that, even where there are
both infringing and noninfringing uses of a service, the provider of the service
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly to eliminate or at
least reduce substantially the infringing uses in order to avoid liability as a
contributory infringer.23 ' This reading imposes a significantly tougher standard
than the mere capability of substantial noninfringing use mentioned in Sony."3
Nor was the court impressed by Aimster's argument that its encryption feature
protected it from the requisite knowledge of specific infringing acts. Willful
blindness, the court observed, is knowledge in copyright law, where even reason
to know may be sufficient for liability.2 3 2 "Aimster blinded itself in the hope that
by doing so it might come within the rule of the Sony decision." '233 Overall, the
balance weighed in favor of contributory liability.
226 See id. at 650.
" The court observed that the Sony majority was well aware, for example, that up to 25% of
VCR users were infringing by fast-forwarding through commercials, but nonetheless found Sony not
liable for contributory infringement. Id. at 649.
228 Id. at 652.
" Id. at 649-53. The court suggested several arguably noninfringing uses for Aimster, including
space-shifting and exchanges of non-copyrighted information, but observed that Aimster failed to
produce evidence of any such activities on its service, much less of their frequency relative to
infringing uses.
230 Id. at 653.
231 See Dogan, supra note 58, at 953 n.82 (detailing the wide variations in the courts' interpretation
of the substantial noninfringing use standard). They include requirements for mere capability of
noninfringing use, commercially significant noninfringing use, and negative requirements that the
technology not be primarily used for infringement. The confusion stems from Sony itself. Dogan
advocates a context-specific approach intended to protect only consumers' access to technologies
whose development would be justified by noninfringing uses. Id. at 942, 943. The Ninth Circuit,
in Grokster II, specifically rejected Posner's probability analysis as well as his criticism of Napstea's
reading of the knowledge requirement. Groksterff, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9.
232 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
233 Id. at 653.
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Having found Aimster contributorily liable, the court was not required to
decide the question of vicarious liability.2 34 In a troubling bit of dicta, the court
noted that the doctrine could have been applied in Sony on the theory that Sony
could have reduced the likelihood of infringement by a design change.
3 5
Similarly, Aimster could have designed its system to limit infringement by
avoiding the encryption feature and monitoring its system.2 36 To the extent that
this passage seems to open the door to a requirement that technologies be
designed to avoid copyright infringement, it clearly diverges from Sony. Aimster
apparently emboldened the plaintiffs in the Grokster appeal to make a similar
claim, which the Ninth Circuit rejected. In a somewhat circuitous passage, the
court appeared to tie the duty to alter software to prevent infringement to a prior
finding of liability for vicarious infringement.237
While giving file sharing technology due attention, the Aimster court resisted
the proclivity toward technology-centered results so evident in the Napster and
Grokster II decisions. The opinion centers instead on the most appropriate way
to implement fundamental copyright policies, particularly the balancing of the
benefits of copyright incentives against those of technological innovation in
unrelated markets. The court's analysis focuses on the content exchanged on
Aimster, not on the mechanics of its delivery. The Aimster decision offers a
glimpse of a more media-neutral analysis which courts might employ to avoid the
disparate judicial treatment of similar technologies which inevitably creates new
issues for resolution by the courts or Congress.
IV. THE DISADVANTAGES OF TECHNOLOGY-CENTRIC DECISIONMAKING
In this part, I discuss several flaws in the courts' analyses in the key
technology-centered cases-Micro Star, Tasini, and Napster-and raise related
questions concerning the level of the courts' understanding of the technologies
involved. These cases demonstrate the disadvantages of technology-centered
decisionmaking, which might be remedied by a more media-neutral analysis.
234 See id.
" Sonfs relevance to vicarious liability claims may be questioned. The Napster court, for
example, asserted that Sony was irrelevant to the vicarious liability claim. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1022.
236 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 654-55.
231 GroksterII, 380 F.3d at 1165-66.
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A. ANALYTIC APPROACH
The courts in the technology-centered cases emphasize detailed parsing of
definitional copyright concepts, application of those concepts in the context of
equally detailed explications of complex technologies, and reasoning by analogy
to prior, nondigital media. It is natural that courts, when first encountering new
media of fixation, first turn to the statutory language of the Copyright Act, as
supplemented by judicially-created doctrines. However, some courts, like the
Court in White-Smith, may go no farther, relying heavily on formalistic interpreta-
tions of statutory language, or extant black letter rules, with little or no analysis of
the underlying policies the law was meant to achieve.23 The courts in the
technology-centered cases rely heavily on this dictionary definition approach,
attempting to wedge new technologies into definitional concepts of copies,
fixation, derivative works, revision, and secondary liability.239
The propensity toward the definitional approach may be exacerbated in cases
involving electronic technologies because of the complexity of the systems
themselves. Having just been introduced to remarkably complicated technologies,
the courts must categorize them for purposes of copyright law using extraordi-
narily arcane terminologies whose meanings evolved in a print-based universe.
The courts, in the technology-centered cases, explain in great particularity the
exact functioning of the systems, as they understand them, then rely heavily on
application of definitional concepts to that functionality in reaching judgment.
In Micro Star, the focus on technological dissection obscures, perhaps
intentionally, the functional equivalence of the Game Genie and Nuke It.24° In
Napster, the court imports the Napster's architectural limitations into its
redefinition of the knowledge requirement for contributory liability, producing a
more demanding standard-actual knowledge of specific acts of infringe-
ment-than the traditional know or reason to know standard. 4' In Tasini, liability
equally turns on the functional characteristics of the databases.242 In all three
White-Smith Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
2 Trotter Hardy, addressing the issue of new subject matters, refers to this as "the dictionary
definition approach." See Trotter Hardy, The Copyrightabiliy Of New Works Of Authorship: 'X-M1L
Schemas" as an Exaple, 38 HOUSTON L. REV. 855, 861 (2001). Courts frequently resort to the
definitional approach when faced with new technologies. See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1974) (holding that cable retransmissions
of broadcast programming did not constitute public performances within the meaning of the
Copyright Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 158 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1 (1968).
240 See Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1007, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
241 SeeA&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (7th Cir.
2003).
242 See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2003).
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cases, the courts occasionally appear to be "blinded by science": so engrossed in
drawing technical distinctions among systems that they ignore broader similarities
and obscure or truncate discussion of significant policy issues. 24 3  . I
To the extent that the specifics of the technology guide the courts' ultimate
judgments, one must be concerned about the completeness of their understand-
ing. Most judges lack computer science degrees. Consequently, decisions focused
too closely on system characteristics should be viewed critically. In Galoob, for
example, the court fails to mention that the extra powers unleashed by the Game
Genie were "Easter eggs" built in to the original games by Nintendo's designers
and simply activated by the Genie's codes, a factoid that would seem to support
the court's conclusion that the Genie created no derivative works.
244
In Tasini, the majority frequently refers to NEXIS as a single database,245
though it is, in fact, a collection of many individual databases. Neither opinion
in the case questions the presumption that the print publication is the original
compilation and the electronic publications are, potentially, revisions of it. From
a technical standpoint, however, one might more appropriately view the print
version and the text-based electronic versions as separate, but related, spin-offs
from the New York Times' pre-existing electronic files,246 just as one might view
the printed Times and the web-based version of the Times as related, but separate
publications (fraternal twins, not parent and child).247 The time lag between the
243 In Micro Star, there is little significant discussion of the policies favoring innovation so central
to the fair use analysis in Galoob. The courts in Napster and Tasini, raise policy arguments which
ultimately take a back seat to the definitional arguments. While not discussed at length in this part,
the opinions in Faulkner, Greenberg and Grokster are almost entirely definitional in approach. Only
the court in Aimster successfully integrates necessary definitional analysis with full exploration of
underlying policy issues.
244 See STEVEN L. KENT, THE ULTIMATE HISTORY OF VIDEOGAMES 390 (2001). "Easter Eggs"
are hidden surprises built into games by programmers. The first such "Egg," for example, was a
secret room which was very difficult to discover. Id. at 185-89.
245 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499-500.
246 Most of the content of the New York Times was in electronic form before it was published in
print. The publishers provided Lexis-Nexis with a complete copy of the same computer text files
which the publishers used to produce the hard copy versions of their periodicals. The publishers
added page lay out instructions to these files to produce "mechanicals"-which resembled full pages
as they would appear at publication-copies of which were transmitted to printing facilities for mass
production. Lexis-Nexis used the same electronic files to put the contents of each article on-line
along with such information as the author's name, the publication, and page number. Tasini v. New
York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 808, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1084-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
247 See THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THE WEB, at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Apr. 3,
2005). Nowadays, the articles printed in the hard copy New York Times appear daily, in HTML
format, in the Web-based version of The New York Times, complete with hyperlinks to other
articles in each edition and archives of past articles.
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appearance of the print copy and the appearance of the electronic versions, 2' and
the implicit understanding that the print version was the flagship publication seem
to be the only reasons to characterize the hard copy as an original and the
electronic versions as revisions.249 Such a reading favors the majority's result,
though not its reasoning, with respect to the text-based articles. On the other
hand, the image-based version contained on GPO, created by digitally scanning
the printed publications,"' is much more likea true revision of the original. The
opinions fail to distinguish it as they should have if the justices' understanding of
the technologies had been complete. Instead, both opinions fall back on
generalized analogies to physical libraries and microfilm.
Again, it is a natural and time-honored judicial practice to use analogies to
render complex systems in simpler, more comprehensible terms. In general,
however, the analogies to prior media used by courts in the storage-and-retrieval
cases fail to convince. The two opinions in Tasini differ entirely, and at length,
over the conclusions to be drawn from analogies to microfilm and physical
libraries.2"1  Midway compares videogame enhancements to speeded-up phono
248 The online versions of the New York Times and Newsday appeared within twenty-four hours
after the print newspaper. Sports Illustrated appeared considerably later-within forty-five days.
The time delay for NYTO was longer; NEXIS transferred magnetic tapes of the data to the CD
manufacturer on a monthly basis. The agreements for data transfer had been in place for almost a
decade before Tasini arose. See Taini, 972 F. Supp. at 808.
249 The entire thrust of publishing technologies for well over a decade has been to enable
publication of multiple works in a variety of media from the same electronic sources, while
minimizing conversions between electronic formats. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 239, at 898-908
(describing the development of standardized markup languages identifying various parts of different
kinds of documents for search purposes as well as establishing formatting of text for purposes of
display or printing).
2'0 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 804, 808-09.
2"1 The majority opinion rejected the publishers' analogy of the databases to microfilm or
microfiche reproductions of periodicals, noting that microfilms usually contain miniature
photographic images of entire periodicals with each article in exactly the same context in which it
originally appeared. Rejecting the argument that a microfilm roll contains many publications, like
a database, and that the user can focus the lens on one article at a time, the court insisted that the
critical issue was whether the user initially encountered the article in context. If the articles were not
perceptib4 fixed within the context of the original compilation, which they clearly were not in the
databases, there was no "revision." The court offered instead its own analogy to an imaginary library
containing separate copies of each article which could be retrieved and physically reproduced on
demand, a clear violation of the authors' rights. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 501-02. However, Justice
Stevens' dissent buys the publishers' analogy to microfilm, observing that a microfilm of an edition
of the New York Times does not cease to be a revision when it is stored on the same roll of film as
other editions of the Times. Inclusion on the database is no different from storage of individual
issues of the newspaper in a library. As with microfilm, the fact that an individual user might view
or print copies of individual articles stored on databases should be irrelevant to their status as
revisions since nothing intrinsic in the databases dictates to the user how much of a particular edition
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graphs.25 2 The Galoob court dredges up the art reproductions pasted on tiles in the
Mirage Ediions case, contrasting their physical incorporation of the copyrighted
works with the Game Genie's temporary substitution of data values, and
comparing the Game Genie to a lens allowing buyers to view several art images
simultaneously.2 53  In a variation on the lens analogy, the Micro Star court
analogizes the Genie to a pink screen held in front of a television set, which alters
the images but does not capture them in concrete form.254
These analogies fail to capture the complexity of the underlying technologies.
None of the analogs involve a separate copyrightable artifact, the computer
program, which functions as an intermediary facilitating production of displays.
None of the analogs permit the manipulation of content, by publishers as well as
users, facilitated by electronic data. Nor are the markets similar.255 The analogies
to physical libraries containing physical copies do not capture the intermediate
instantiation of the works in electronic files which translate the intangible work
into visible displays nor can a library be characterized, as a database can, as a
collective work in its own right.
The Napster and Aimster courts fare better in the use of analogy, possibly
because their analogies focus not on particular media, but on legal relationships.
The Napster court's analogy of the Napster system to the physical premises of a
swap meet explains Napster's role vis-A-vis its subscribers.256 TheAimstercourt's
analogy of Aimster to a stock exchange is apt because it clarifies that the goods
to view or print. Id. at 517-18. Interestingly, the Greenberg court specifically rejected this analogy,
observing that microform does not require the intervention of a separate copyrightable work, a
computer program, to permit viewing by the user. See Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc., 244 F.3d
1267 at 1273 n.12, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (11th Cit. 2001).
252 See Midway Mfg. Co. v Attic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 791, 794
(7th Cir. 1983).
253 Lewis Galoob, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968-69, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1857, 1859-60 (9th Cit. 1992) (citing Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d
1341, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1171 (9th Cit. 1988) (holding that lawfully acquired art reproductions,
when pasted on ceramic tiles for display, constituted derivative works)). This is a questionable
precedent even for analog derivative works. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1153 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Mirage on nearly identical facts and comparing mounting
reproductions on tiles to framing them).
254 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 n.4, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026,1029 n.4
(9th Cit. 1998).
255 The electronic market for news articles, for example, favors copies of individual articles in a
way that the microform market does not. See Giuseppina D'Agostino, Copyright Treatment OfFreelance
Work In The DigitalEra, 19 SANTA CLARA CoMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 37, 73, 74 (2002) (noting that
the court lacks understanding of the freelance market).
256 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-24 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auctions, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590 (9th Cit. 1996)).
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are not traded on the premises. 257 Well-drawn analogies might actually promote
technology-neutral results by clarifying similarities and differences between
systems, but the resort to analogy in the technology-centered cases is more often
a source of confusion than of clarity.
Overall, the courts in the technology-centered cases rely on dictionary
definitions, technical explication, and reasoning by analogy as a means of
bolstering policy analyses which are relatively undeveloped or underemphasized.
The Micro Star court engages in minimal policy analysis. While the Napster court
expresses concern about the impact on innovation of the district court's broad
injunction,218 it confines that impact by essentially reading Napster's technological
limitations into the requirements for secondary liability, rather than relying on its
policy-based fair use analysis. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Tasini
marshal complex technological arguments in support of an essentially simple
difference of opinion over the implementation of clear congressional policy
protecting the entitlements of authors against overbearing publishers.2 9 In the
absence of significant empirical evidence, the opinions rely on convoluted
readings of statutory language applied to technological particulars, producing
opposing interpretations of the meaning of media neutrality as well as of the
scope of the revision privilege.
The courts' reluctance to rely on policy arguments supported by empirical
evidence may stem from their discomfort in the policymaking role, in light of
Congress's greater institutional competence and the potential consequences to
lucrative copyright markets. However, by concentrating on technological
specifics, rather than overarching policies, the courts in these cases create
problems both for those markets and for later courts.
B. EFFECTS OF THE TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH
Technology-centered judgments produce several related, undesirable effects.
Their narrow specificity may create uncertainty as to their applicability to existing,
roughly equivalent technologies. They also generate incentives for developers to
design around specific legal requirements, ultimately producing further litigation
and steering innovation in directions which may prove inefficient or otherwise
suboptimal.
257 See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233, 1236
(7th Cir. 2003).
258 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
259 The majority believes that authors, not publishers, ought to profit from new electronic
markets. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497. The dissent believes that both authors' interests and the public
interest in dissemination will be better served by allowing publishers to redistribute the contents of
their collections in electronic formats. Id. at 520-24.
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Judicial over-reliance on the specifics of particular technologies produces
uncertainty as to which technological variations will be deemed infringing and
which will not.26° For example, since computer programs utilize different kinds
of memory and organize memory in different ways, it is difficult to predict where
a particular videogame system may fall in the Galoob-Micro Star spectrum. 261' The
majority opinion in Tasini offers little guidance for future developers of database
compilations. Napster's technology-driven result essentially guaranteed future
litigation over systems which avoided the central server architecture. The current
path of that litigation may, ultimately, force the legislative intervention which
media neutrality was meant to avoid.
Napsterclearly illustrates that technology-centered judgments invite innovators
to design around the specific elements found to infringe. The practice is
reminiscent of the practice of designing around the claims of a patent. Here,
however, inventors are designing around the requirements of the copyright law
itself as interpreted through application to certain technologies. Such practices
breed disrespect for the law and tend to produce further, expensive litigation as
courts must pass judgment on each new technological variant.
In addition to encouraging further litigation, technology-centered judgments
may forcibly steer development toward less efficient technologies than those the
market would develop if left to its own devices. For example, fully contextual
image-based or textual databases can be produced, but are likely to be more
expensive than text-based alternatives. Many database users would undoubtedly
find such a presentation inconvenient to download or use.262 While decentralized
file sharing systems have advanced considerably, centralized services like those
ruled illegal in Napster and Aimster may be more efficient.
26 3
260 One might equally argue, of course, that Sony-based analyses produce unpredictable results.
261 See, e.g., Edward G. Black & Michael H. Page, Add-On Infrin'gements: When ComputerAdd-Ons
and Peripherals Should (and Should Not) Be Considered Infinging Derivative Works Under Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., and Other Recent Decisions, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
615, 625-26 (1993).
262 See Laurie A. Santelli, Note, New Battles Between FreelanceAuthorsAnd Publishers In The Aftermath
OfTasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 253, 295 (1998).
263 Wu, supra note 55, at 717.
The technical study of P2P design shows that designing a P2P file sharing
network to avoid copyright requires important deviations from the optimal
design for speed, control, and usability. The programmers of a copyright-
resistant P2P network must balance an interest in avoiding legal liability against
the competing interests of ensuring performance on a mass scale, maintaining
system stability, and fostering network trust. These matters all require control
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Judge Posner's implication in Aimster that developers might be required to
alter their designs in order to avoid vicarious liability would actually worsen the
adverse effect of judicial intervention by directly involving courts in technological
determinations best left to developers."' While uncertainty as to the scope of
copyright protection may reduce incentives for copyright owners to release their
works in digital formats, the greater adverse impact may be on incentives for
technology providers to push innovation in directions which are efficient and
economically and technologically sound. Judicial steering of technology,
combined with the unpredictability of future legal results, may chill innovation,
which Sony sought to avoid by adopting a less technology-focused, more policy-
driven analysis.
From the standpoint of media neutral decisionmaking, two aspects of Sony are
notable: that it employed a policy-based analysis centered on balancing the need
for copyright incentives against the public interest in innovation, and that it was
relatively indifferent to the specifics of videotape recorder technology, focusing
on what the videotape recorder did, not on how it did it.265 Sony offers some
guidance in crafting a more media-neutral approach which alleviates some of the
problems associated with technology-centered decisionmaking. If courts, in the
interest of applying copyright law in a media neutral manner to protect the
legitimate rights of copyright owners, must effectively prohibit some technologies
or certain uses of them, a more comprehensive method of analysis would assure
that the courts take into account the broader policy concerns and market impacts
which should drive their decisionmaking.
V. MEDIA-NEUTRAL, POLICY-INFORMED ADJUDICATION
Numerous commentators have analyzed the challenges to copyright posed by
electronic media and have suggested various strategies for revising copyright law
to meet those challenges. Suggested cures include recasting copyright to protect
rights of access266 or of commercial exploitation267 and incorporation of more
264 The appellants in GroksterIl urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt an alternative design rule in that
case. As an opposing anicus brief pointed out, such a rule would embroil the courts in technological
decisionmaking, allow copyright owners to control technological development, and adversely impact
innovation. See Brief of 40 Amici Curiae Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors, at
17-19, Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 03-55894, 03-55901), available at http://www.
eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM vGrokster/#nc-defendant-amicus.
" The court describes the workings of the VCR in reasonable detail, but does not rely on
technological detail in reaching its judgment. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417,422-23, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 670 (1984).
266 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 3.
267 See, e.g., LITMiAN, supra note 104, at 180.
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explicit recognition of user's rights.268 No major legislative overhaul appears
imminent, however, and courts must adjust existing copyright law as best they can
to fit new technologies. The principle of media neutrality was adopted by
Congress for that purpose and judicial adherence to media-neutral analysis should
improve copyright's flexibility in the near term. The following proposals for
assuring media neutrality may be viewed as a set of stopgap measures to keep
copyright workable in the interim before copyright law's next legislative
transformation, if one should occur.
The results in the technology-centered cases suggest that the courts became
so enamored of technological distinctions that they failed to accord similar
treatment to equivalent technologies, pronounce doctrinal rules of general
applicability across technologies, or give appropriate weight to broader policy
concerns. Three rules-of-thumb should keep courts on a media-neutral keel.
First, where statutory guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts should afford
functionally equivalent technologies, whether analog or digital, similar treatment
under copyright law unless they can articulate a compelling doctrinal or policy
reason that dictates otherwise. Second, courts interpreting copyright doctrines in
light of new technologies should avoid emphasis on the details of particular
technological systems and interpret copyright's core concepts in terms applicable
across technologies. Third, courts should give more weight to broader policy
considerations such as fairness, incentives, and innovation, and should consider
empirical evidence relevant to those policy determinations. While judgments
should be technology-sensitive, they should not be technology-driven; technologi-
cal detail may matter, but should not, standing alone, be outcome-determinative.
A. THE GUIDELINES
Media neutrality implies that, in the absence of clear statutory guidance, courts
make at least rough judgments of equivalence not only between analog and digital
technologies, but also between different digital technologies. Rather than relying
on analogies to lenses or pink screens, courts should focus on the functional
equivalence of works embodied and delivered in different media. Very loosely
adopting a principle from patent law, this approach might be described as a sort
of inverted function-way-result test: if two technologies perform the same
function or produce the same result, even though they do so in different ways,
courts should accord them similar treatment under copyright law unless an
overriding, well-articulated doctrine or policy concern dictates otherwise.
268 See, e.g., Liu, supra note 41, at 1337-60.
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In analog to digital transformations of content, media neutrality requires that
the essential addition of functional software simply to enable communication of
the content should not, in itself, be viewed as creation of a new, possibly
infringing, derivative or collective work. Derivative and collective works should
require some additional variation from the original. Content merely enabled by
software should be seen as the functional equivalent of an analog copy, if the
work is captured in sufficiently stable form. Different digital storage and retrieval
technologies that equally serve to capture copies of content should receive like
*treatment. Media neutrality also suggests that uploading or downloading a work
over a network should be treated as the functional equivalent of distribution of
physical copies, again provided that the work takes relatively stable form at the
end point of the transaction.
269
Some analysis of system functionality is unavoidable in technology-intensive
cases and courts would be well-advised to employ neutral technical experts,
provided the courts can resist the impulse to rely entirely on technological detail
as the basis for judgment. The district court in Napster employed such an
expert.270 Courts should have enough basic understanding of the technology to
make well-informed choices when they seek to compare equivalent
technologies. 1 Interested parties in litigation are unlikely to provide complete,
unbiased expertise, not only because they act as advocates, but also because of
information asymmetries. In some instances, one side may possess expertise that
the other does not.
272
269 This conclusion does not necessarily mandate that temporary RAM copies should be viewed
as functional equivalents of permanent copies, though the courts to date have certainly taken that
view. While the RAM copy doctrine clearly has adverse consequences unforeseen by Congress,
neither Congress nor the courts have altered it legislatively or judicially in the ten years that have
passed since the court in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1458 (9th Cir. 1993), formulated it. At this point, resistance may be a less effective strategy
(i.e., "futile") than damage control through, for example, reliance on the public display right, implied
license theories, or personal use privileges.
270 See A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1097, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221
(upholding the lower court's use of a technical advisor against Napster's claim that the court
improperly delegated its judicial authority).
271 Japan's Supreme Court recently announced appointment of a large roster of intellectual
property experts to assist its judges in navigating the complexities of both the law and the
technology. See 100 Intellectual Property Experts to Assist Judges, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 28, 2003 (copy
on file with author). As intellectual property cases grow ever more complex, such a resource could
be invaluable in this country as well.
272 The publishers in Tasini, 523 U.S. 483, for example, were surely aware that print and electronic
products could be viewed as spinoffs from the same electronic sources, but it did not behoove them
to argue the point. The freelancers and their attorneys were unlikely to understand the processes
employed by print and electronic publishers.
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To the extent that the copyright balance of incentives and access has been
appropriately set for a pre-existing technology, similar treatment of functional
equivalents should maintain that balance. A focus on functional equivalency
might also direct the courts' search for apt analogies into a more fruitful path.
Parties may, and likely will, differ over the appropriate equivalent for a given
technology and courts may still misunderstand the true nature of new technolo-
gies.273 Nonetheless, by directing their inquiry towards general functional
equivalence and away from dissection of system specifics, courts may avoid
pinning their judgments on short-lived technological detail rather than lasting
principles governing rights and liabilities.
A judicial predisposition to treat functional equivalents similarly in the absence
of guidance from Congress would not prevent Congress from mandating
otherwise in the exercise of its greater institutional ability to weigh the full
spectrum of competing interests in the setting of copyright policy. Congress
might well choose, as it has in the past, to treat equivalent technologies differently
and courts are, of course, bound by that determination. For example, in cases
involving video rentals to hotel guests, courts distinguished between differently
configured in-room video delivery systems where Congress established a basis for
differential treatment in the statutory definition of public performance2. 4 and
through clear references to hotel rentals in the legislative history.7 '
273 See, for example, Teleprompter Cop. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 191
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1974), in which the Supreme Court found that cable television companies
retransmitting broadcast signals performed the equivalent of viewer functions (receiving signals)
rather than broadcaster functions, a finding clearly belied by the subsequent development of cable
television systems as competitors of broadcast television.
274 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining the phrase "to display or perform a work 'publicly' ").
Public performances, as defined, include either performances in a public place or transmissions to
such a place or to the public.
275 Cf Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 9 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1653 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no violation of movie studios' public performance right where
hotel provided equipment in each room and rented video discs to individual guests for use in those
rooms); OnCommand Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding violation of the "transmit" portion of the statute where bank
of VCRs were centrally located in hotel equipment room and movies were transmitted to individual
rooms upon request by guests). In both cases, the courts found that rented hotel rooms were not
public places within the meaning of the statute. See ProflRealEstate, 866 F.2d at 281; OnCommand,
777 F. Supp. at 789. However, the statutory definition of the term "transmit" and legislative history
indicating that Congress specifically intended the transmission provision to apply to hotel rooms
made clear, in the opinion of both courts, that the OnCommand system indeed transmitted a
performance while the Real Estate Investors' system did not. See Profl RealEstate, 866 F.2d at 282,
n.7; OnCommond, 777 F. Supp. at 789-90. A functional equivalence approach might in fact produce
the same results, on grounds that the Real Estate Investors' system is equivalent to renting a VCR
and a copy of a movie from a video rental store, while the OnCommand system is the equivalent of
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Additionally, technological distinctions continue to carry some analytical
weight with respect to the primary or secondary nature of the defendant's
potential liability. A defendant like MP3.com which, as a part of its service,
actively reproduced its own copies of works would remain subject to liability as
a direct infringer, 76 while an enabler like Napster would remain subject to the
standards for contributory or vicarious liability. To some extent, the determina-
tion of functional equivalence might automatically encompass these
distinctions. 77
In some cases, as in Midway,278 there may be no pre-existing functional
equivalent to a new digital technology, or at least none on which a prior court has
passed judgment. In that event, courts must apply copyright principles in
unfamiliar contexts. They should resist the impulse to rewrite those principles in
terms of technology specifics which are likely to change over time. One would
not expect a court to alter the established rules for contributory liability, for
example, by revising them to fit the technology of a particular case as the court
did in Napster. To the extent that courts adapt principles from related fields, or
establish new doctrine, they should be careful to formulate the doctrine in
technology-neutral terms. In Son, for example, the court states the staple article
of commerce doctrine, borrowed from patent law, in terms which apply across
technologies. 279  For cases arising after the case of first impression, media
neutrality indicates that different digital products which perform the same
function should receive similar legal treatment, provided that the court of first
impression has correctly interpreted the applicable legal principles and weighed
the relevant policy issues.
Adherence to the black letter law should be leavened by consideration of
broader policy goals-not only those underlying the Copyright Act but also those
favoring technological innovation which are frequently at issue in cases involving
extension of copyright law to new technologies. Courts in technology-intensive
cases should be less hesitant to tackle policy issues head on, rather than by
indirection, and should marshal empirical support for policy-guided
decisionmaking. Sony points in this direction, with its discussions of the broadcast
and VCR markets and its balancing of copyright incentives against innovation in
a broadcast. It should be noted that, unlike the electronic systems discussed herein, neither of these
systems involved reproduction or distribution of a copy.
276 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
277 With respect to MP3.com, for example, the court's determination that the service's activities
were the equivalent of copying, rather than the equivalent of storing music in a locker, settled its
direct liability. Id. at 350.
278 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 791 (7th Cit. 1983).
279 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984).
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other markets.28 ° Sony deploys a policy of deference to the legislature where
copyright expansion might endanger unrelated markets, but unlike White-Smith,
bases that deference not on formalistic interpretation of statutory definitions, but
on a pragmatic analysis of the implicated policies and available empirical
evidence.281
Courts employing the Sony approach might be expected to explore the
economic impact of copyright extension on the markets involved in each case,
seeking to avoid judicial creation of legal rules that would impose negative
externalities on one industry by protecting another. The importance of protecting
innovation in new and developing markets suggests, moreover, that such concerns
be weighed with respect to all claims of secondary liability, whether contributory
or vicarious, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's attempt to limit Sony's influence
to contributory claims. The principle of media neutrality empowers courts to
expand old rules to cover new technologies. Sony counsels caution in judicial
extension of copyright protection where unrelated markets are implicated,
drawing a line beyond which courts should not go without legislative guidance
based on potential impact on innovation. The legislative forum remains available
for resolution of competing interests in such cases.
The three proposed guidelines are simple and, one would have thought,
obvious, had not the courts in the technology-centered cases so signally failed to
employ them. I do not suggest that courts should abandon due regard for
statutory language or judicial precedent, or even entirely ignore distinctions
between technological systems, but rather that the application of text to
technology should be accompanied by full and fair review of policy concerns and
consideration of likely market impacts. Judgments should not hinge exclusively,
or even primarily, on fine distinctions among the mechanics of different delivery
systems. Adherence to the proposed guidelines might produce more satisfactory
rationales in Micro Star, Tasini, and Napster.
B. RETHINKING THE CASES
The decisions in the technology-centered cases may be reconstructed using the
balanced, policy-informed analysis proposed above. In Micro Star, such
reconstruction not only alters the form of the analysis and the nature of liability,
but might actually produce a different outcome. In Tasini and Napster, the
280 The Sony majority engages in a fairly lengthy discussion of consumer surveys regarding the
purposes of home taping, mixed opinions in the broadcast industry as to whether home taping was
advantageous or detrimental to content owners, testimony concerning authorized home taping for
educational and religious purposes, and the like. Id. at 423-24.
281 Id. at 431.
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guidelines, in combination with clearer understanding of the technology and
alternative theories of liability, would not change the result but would provide a
more comprehensive analysis.
1. Micro Star. The games cases represent a complete cycle of a case of first
impression, followed by a doctrinal reinterpretation informed by policy analysis,
followed by a technology-centered alteration lacking a doctrinal or policy base.
Midway was the case of first impression. Somewhat hamstrung by the plaintiff's
failure to copyright its code as well as its audiovisual displays, the court did its
best to apply derivative works principles as informed by its policy concerns with
market harm, hence disincentives to creators, and flexibility of interpretation.
While the decision in Galoob departs from Midway, it does so based on its
generalized conclusion that the derivative works doctrine requires some physical
embodiment, an issue not addressed by the Midway court. In its fair use dicta, the
Galoob court also provides a policy analysis supporting its rejection of the Seventh
Circuit precedent.
Micro Star, on the other hand, applies the same legal principles to a functionally
equivalent technology, but relies on technical differences in the systems to
distinguish Galoob. While the Game Genie and Nuke If s MAP files operate in
different ways, both are essentially triggers kicking off game enhancements.
Under the functional equivalency guideline, they should be treated similarly unless
the court can come up with a sound doctrinal or policy reason for doing
otherwise.
The court might, for example, have reassessed its interpretation of derivative
works infringement as requiring a concrete embodiment rather than twisting the
doctrine to encompass mere description. No other circuit has adopted the
embodiment standard; if the Ninth Circuit had abandoned it, Galoob would no
longer be controlling. Unless the court shifted its doctrinal stance, however,
media neutrality would indicate that Galoob should preclude any finding of direct
infringement because the MAP files did not embody Formgen's protected
material.
Interestingly, the Micro Star court might have applied the RAM copy doctrine,
which did not exist at the time Galoob was decided,282 to establish infringing
embodiment (indeed full fixation) not in the MAP files, but in the displays
produced on users' screens and necessarily captured in RAM. Using that
approach, the court should have analyzed the case as involving contributory,
rather than direct, liability. The court might well have found that Micro Star
knowingly enabled end users to recreate altered game displays. It should then
282 The court adopted the RAM copy doctrine in MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518.
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have determined whether Micro Star was protected by fair use and the staple
article of commerce doctrine.
The different nature of the markets in Galoob and Micro Star, and clear free-
riding by Micro Star, might tip the analysis in Formgen's favor were it not for the
existence of the user license, which weighs in favor of a result that the court
clearly wished to avoid.283 Though the court gave short shrift to the licensing and
abandonment arguments, Formgen surely should have foreseen the possibility
that an enterprising third party, not bound by Formgen's license, would make use
of the new levels; Formgen must have weighed that risk against the value gained
from broader dissemination and user satisfaction and assumed the risk. At a
minimum, the license should affect the fair use analysis by negating any
expectation by Formgen that it could exercise market rights in the user-created
levels. More broadly, the license may constitute abandonment of any claim to
rights in the new levels. Formgen should go home empty-handed to reconsider
its marketing strategy.
2. Tasini. There are several alternative analyses which might have produced
more satisfactory rationales in Tasini. A better understanding of the technologies
involved and a clearer focus on the different products and the rights infringed,
balanced by a more comprehensive statement of the policy underlying section
201, would produce stronger support for the majority's result.
In the simplest approach to the case, the court should, as suggested above,284
view the print publication and the files provided to NEXIS and NYTO as
different spinoffs from the same electronic source. Consequently, NEXIS and
NYTO cannot conceivably be viewed as revisions of the print publications, even
under a dictionary definition approach. The image-based GPO, on the other
hand, is a subsequent re-use of the print publications which must be analyzed
separately, but which appears to constitute a new anthology, not a revision. Even
if one rejects this analysis and assumes that NEXIS and NYTO are successors to
the print publication, the proposed guidelines produce the same results.
NEXIS provides two different products: access to databases for research
purposes and downloads for later use. Clearly the functional equivalent of a copy
of the print compilations is produced in the database itself regardless of how it is
stored. Reasonable minds might differ over whether such inclusion in the
database creates a new collective work. However, a focus on distribution suggests
that, at a minimum, NEXIS actively distributed the functional equivalent of
copies of the individual articles, directly violating the authors' distribution right.
285
Users downloading individual articles also created the functional equivalents of
283 See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113-14.
284 See infra Part III.B.
285 See Gordon, supra note 38, at 475-76, 488-89.
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copies, violating the reproduction right, for which the publishers would be
contributorily responsible, making the Sony defense relevant, though a finding of
direct infringement of the distribution right would render such analysis superflu-
ous.
The NYTO and GPO CDs, on the other hand, were distributed as compila-
tions of original issues, requiring a more extensive inquiry into whether they were
functional equivalents of revisions or new collective works. Congress, in the
legislative history, indicated that a
publishing company could reprint a contribution from one issue in
a later issue of its magazine, and could reprint an article from a 1980
edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it, but publishers
could not revise the contribution itself or include it in a new
anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective
work.286
Since GPO included publications other than those taken from the New York
Times, it clearly constitutes a new anthology and, hence, a new collective work
under section 201(c). NYTO, which accumulated only issues of the New York
Times, presents a more difficult case. The Faulkner court read the "entirely
different" language to indicate that a collective work which is merely somewhat
different from the original is privileged and relies on Tasini dictum regarding
microforms to conclude that accumulations of issues of the same periodical are
permissible.28" One can as easily read the passage, standing alone, to indicate that
an accumulation of issues, like NYTO, is a new anthology collecting multiple,
previous compilations (the individual issues). In the absence of clear direction
from Congress, the court should have resolved the question by emphasizing the
policy underlying section 201(c).
The legislative history of section 201(c) clearly supports the majority's
interpretation of Congress's intent to equalize the balance of power between
individual authors and publishers.288 The overriding policy issue reflected in that
history is fairness in the allocation of incentives for creation, not, as Justice
Stevens argues, efficiency of dissemination. The majority offers sufficient
empirical evidence to support that policy analysis, based on the impact on the
286 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122-23 (1976).
287 Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 294 F. Supp. 2d 523,540-41,69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370,
1384 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
2"8 Wendy Gordon observes: "Given what Congress intended when enacting the provision, it
seems absurd to contend that publishers who pay for print rights should also presumptively have
free rein to sell mass licenses to electronic media." Gordon, supra note 38, at 484-85.
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authors' markets for new anthologies. Had the court emphasized this argument
and clarified the question whether accumulation of multiple issues was permissi-
ble, it might have avoided the result in Faulkner, which undercuts the policy
protecting authors. Indeed, the combination of Tasini, Faulkner, and the
publishers' new practice of requiring that freelancers license all conceivable rights
as a prerequisite to publication,289 suggests that if Congress retains any interest in
protecting powerless freelancers against overreaching publishers, it must devise
a better mechanism than section 201(c).
The court would have done well to pursue an alternative argument, urged by
the Register of Copyrights, that the critical right infringed in Tasini was the right
of public display. The Register argued "vigorously" that the display of individual
articles to users violated the authors' right to public display and that since section
201(c) provides publishers no display privilege, the defendants should be held
liable.29 ° This approach, had the court taken it, might have avoided the difficulty
of defining copies and revisions, and their functional equivalents, in the electronic
context. When combined with the policy analysis, it would also have provided a
more satisfactory rationale for the result.
3. Napster. Re-imagining Napster is fairly simple since Judge Posner came
close to doing so inAimster.29 The functional equivalence guideline indicates that
peer-to-peer systems, whether they are centralized or decentralized, enable the
same activity-sharing of copyrighted works among users-and should be
accorded similar treatment under copyright law absent an overriding doctrinal or
policy concern. The focus on generalized rules precludes the rewriting of the
rules of secondary liability to fit Napster's particular architecture. Under the
traditional test for contributory liability, Napster clearly met both the knowledge
and material contribution requirements. The staple article of commerce doctrine,
properly construed, would then require that the court determine whether Napster
had substantial noninfringing uses. The court could simply have emphasized its
fair use analysis, where the lack of strong empirical evidence for noninfringing
uses, the continuing relationship between Napster and its users, and the unified
29 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyrnght Law After Tasini, 53 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 605 (2003).
2" New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 n.8, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1812 n.8
(2001).
291 Cf. In rn Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729 (9th Cir.) (2001).
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front presented by the music industry2 92 would have produced the same result
without reliance on Napster's architecture.
The court inAimsteruses the same techniques used in the technology-centered
cases-technical explication, reasoning by analogy, application of copyright
concepts to the facts at hand without losing sight of overriding policy
concerns. 29 3 The court recognizes Napster as a functional equivalent of Aimster
and departs from Napster not on the basis of system architecture, but on the
fundamental issue of interpretation of the requirements for secondary liability.294
The court's interpretation of the staple article of commerce doctrine to require
empirical evidence of the magnitude of infringing and noninfringing uses and a
balancing by the court of the relative importance of those uses sets a standard
which may exceed that established by Sony.295 The suggestion that developers
might be required to redesign products to avoid vicarious liability is certainly ill-
conceived. Nonetheless, viewed as a method of analysisJudge Posner's approach
puts the court where it should be-judging the parties' competing interests based
on application of generalized copyright principles to the facts adduced with due
regard for significant policy concerns. ThoughAimsterresulted in the shut-down
of a particular file sharing service, it left the door open for the next "killer app"
for peer-to-peer to establish substantial noninfringing uses immunizing it from
liability under Sony. While the future of peer-to-peer may be no more predictable
under such an analysis, it depends on establishment of new, noninfringing
markets, rather than on technological redesign to avoid legal barriers.
Applying a more media-neutral approach in the three cases above, the
respective courts might well have placed emphasis on different aspects of the
analysis, but in no case would the particulars of system architecture have been the
decisive element in decisionmaking. While judicial understanding of the
technology is certainly essential, the policy favoring media neutrality counsels
against giving the technology center stage in infringement determinations.
292 The Sony court relied fairly heavily on the disagreement within the broadcast community over
the costs and benefits of home taping and on the fact that Sony simply sold the VCR, thereafter
having no control over its users. See generalA Sony, 464 U.S. 417. In Napster, while artists were
divided, the corporate owners of the large majority of the copyrights involved spoke with a single
voice. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004. Napster also maintained a continuing relationship with its users,
which was essential to their activities. Id.
23 Seegeneral#Aimster, 343 F.3d 643.
294 Id.
295 See Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
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The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act incorporated the doctrine of media
neutrality as a hedge against foreseeable challenges to traditional copyright
principles and policies by electronic media. The rapid pace of modern technologi-
cal change simply precludes legislative resolution of every conflict between
copyright owners and the developers and users of new technologies of copying
and dissemination. Congress rightly expected the courts to take an important role
in resolving those conflicts. I have proposed a fairly expansive reading of media
neutrality in copyright as encouraging judicial indifference to fine technical
distinctions among systems which store and deliver copyrighted content. I have
also suggested that the Sony court's reservations about judicial expansion of
copyright and its policy-based analytic framework establish an important limiting
principle that balances copyright policies against innovation policies.
The media-neutral, policy-sensitive analytic approach suggested above is
anything but revolutionary; it is more in the nature of a reminder to courts to
adhere to Congress' clearly stated intent that copyright principles and results
should not be technology-dependent, unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise.
The proposal encourages a shift in judicial emphasis away from the mechanics of
information storage and delivery towards principles of general applicability and
policy-based analysis employing empirical tools. Judicial deliberations should,
insofar as possible, encompass the broad view as well as the narrow definition and
distribute copyright protection evenhandedly among similar technologies.
Application of that approach to the technology-driven cases discussed above
would have produced more readily transportable interpretations of the relevant
law and reduced the impetus to design around the strictures of copyright law.
Courts employing this analysis may yet come up against some walls which they
rightly refuse to surmount without congressional guidance. In that event, the
courts' expanded rationale might offer a better guide for legislative action should
Congress choose to act. Electronic technologies, and accompanying changes in
cultural attitudes toward copying,296 may ultimately stretch copyright to its
breaking point and require an overhaul of the statute. Some have suggested that
such a revision might require the application of different rules to electronic and
analog works.297 Until that time, judicial adherence to media neutral, policy-
sensitive analysis should provide existing copyright law with the interim flexibility
to adapt to rapidly changing technologies.
26 See, e.g., John Leland, BgondFile shafin& a Naion of Copiers, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Sept. 14,
2003, abstract and link to archive, available athttp://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FBO
Al 6FD3A5FOC778DDDA00894DB404482 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
297 See, e.g., David G. Post, HisNapster's Voice, 20 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. &TECH.J. 35,41-48 (2001).
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